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URANIUM MINING AND MILLING IN VIRGINIA: AN 
ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY CHOICE 
Ronald H. Rosenberg* 
The recent discovery of significant quantities of uranium ore in 
Pittsylvania County, Virginia has generated interest among mining 
companies in mining and milling1 uranium ore in the state.2 The 
discovery has given rise to considerable concern as to whether ura-
nium mining and milling should be permitted in Virginia and, if 
so, how they should be regulated. The prospect of establishing a 
new mining industry in the state would not normally attract as 
much public attention as has the recent proposal to mine uranium. 
However, since uranium is a radioactive material, it has generated 
considerable controversy. 
Uranium has been mined and milled in parts of the western 
United States for over thirty years. However, Virginia could be-
come the first Eastern state to permit uranium production. Since 
the eastern United States differs from the West in climate, geologi-
cal characteristics, and population distribution and density, the so-
cial and ecological impacts of uranium production in Virginia are 
difficult to predict. 
• Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia. B.A., 1971, Columbia University; M.R.P., 1974 and J.D., 1975, Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
The author wishes to recogni2e with gratitude the following research assistants who par-
ticipated in this project: Gary Parker, Carol Brown, Melanie Donohue, Rolly Chambers, 
Will Shewmake, and Barbara Buckley. A special note of thanks is extended to Mrs. Betty 
Abele for the preparation of this manuscript. The author would also like to express his 
appreciation to the Virginia Environmental Endowment for its financial support of the 
project. 
' Milling refers to the process by which uranium ore is converted into concentrated ura-
nium oxide or "yellowcake." See text accompanying notes 13-18 infra. 
1 In July 1982, Marline Oil Corporation announced the discovery of uranium ore in Pitt-
sylvania County, which it described as "one of the most significant uranium discoveries in 
the United States." Marline Oil Corporation, Annual Report to Shareholders 11 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as Marline Shareholder Report]. In December 1982, Marline and Union 
Carbide Corporation entered into an agreement to evaluate uranium mineralization on some 
of Marline's properties within the Swanson Project Area, located about twenty-five miles 
north of Danville, Virginia. I d. During 1983, Marline and Union Carbide completed an eval-
uation of the Project for a Virginia General Assembly study group charged with reviewing 
the costs and benefits, including the environmental impacts, of the proposed mining ven-
ture. I d. at 13. Marline intended to complete its evaluation of the remaining forty-five thou-
sand acres under lease in Pittsylvania County during 1984 and to plan a series of joint 
venture exploration programs on these lands. ld. 
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The Virginia General Assembly will be required to decide 
whether the risks associated with a uranium mining and milling 
industry in Virginia outweigh the benefits to be gained from it. To 
develop a state policy on uranium production, the state must as-
sess the potential impacts of uranium mining and milling on 
worker safety, public health and the natural environment. Other 
Eastern states have approached the issue of uranium mining and 
milling with extreme caution, deferring a decision on whether to 
license the industry for as many as ten years pending the results of 
thorough analysis. 8 The policymakers in Virginia should be no less 
careful in assessing the risks presented by the proposed industry. 
There are several ways to allocate regulatory responsibility over 
the uranium production industry among units of federal, state and 
local government. To illustrate the range of choices available to 
Virginia, this article will describe the means by which other states 
have chosen to regulate uranium mining and milling. This discus-
sion is intended neither to advocate nor to discourage the authori-
zation of uranium production. Instead, it is intended to describe 
the legal framework for its regulation that federal and state gov-
ernments have developed, and to suggest the basis on which Vir-
ginia could choose systematically from among the different regula-
tory schemes. 
Section I of the article presents the current state of the domestic 
uranium mining and milling industry. First, the techniques of min-
ing and milling are described. Second, the section reviews the po-
tential public health and environmental costs and the potential ec-
onomic benefits of a Virginia uranium industry. 
Section II traces the thirty-eight-year history of federal regula-
tion of the uranium industry. This section highlights the federal 
government's shift from exclusive control over nuclear energy and 
source material production, toward sharing that authority with the 
states. 
Section III analyzes the roles that various states have assumed 
in the regulation of the uranium recovery industry. This section 
examines how the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Agreement 
State Program operates in practice, with emphasis on uranium mill 
licensing. The advantages and disadvantages of agreement state af-
filiation are considered. The section identifies four models of state 
involvement in the control of the uranium recovery industry; these 
• See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text. 
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models indicate the range of choices available to Virginia in formu-
lating its policy on uranium production. 
The article will conclude by outlining the possible steps that the 
Virginia General Assembly may take in 1985. Virginia starts with a 
clean slate. It can exclude the industry altogether, or it can specify 
the conditions under which it will authorize mining and milling. In 
this sense, the state can mold the industry to the particular needs 
of the people of Virginia. 
I. THE URANIUM MINING AND MILLING INDUSTRY 
A. Uranium Mining Techniques 
To produce source material for nuclear fuel, uranium must be 
removed from its deposit in nature and processed by an operation 
called "milling." The end product is uranium oxide (U30 8 ), or "yel-
lowcake." Yellowcake is transported to a nuclear enrichment facil-
ity for conversion into nuclear fuel pellets that are fabricated into 
fuel rods for nuclear power plants. 
The initial step toward uranium production is the identification 
of sites with a potential for uranium ore recovery. The location, 
amount, and concentration of the uranium ore body will determine 
if it is worth mining. Surveys conducted by the federal government 
have assisted uranium development firms in the discovery of new 
ore deposits. In 1974, the Department of Energy initiated the Na-
tional Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) program to provide 
accurate uranium survey data by conducting aerial surveys of sur-
face radiation, measuring radioactivity in surface and groundwater, 
and performing underground geological examinations. Uranium-
producing companies supplement these data through geological 
mapping, geochemical surveying, and subsurface core drilling. 
Having decided to mine, the developer must select the mining 
technique. The mining industry has developed four techniques for 
extracting uranium ore from the surrounding minerals: surface or 
open pit mining, underground or deep mining, solution or in situ 
mining, and bore hole mining. 4 
In open pit mining, the topsoil and rock overburden are removed 
from the site and stored at a nearby location. Although surface 
• Open pit and underground mining accounted for seventy-five percent of all domestic 
uranium ore recovered in 1982. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Statistical Data of the Uranium Indus-
try 11 (1983) (Table I-12) (Pub. No. GJ0-100) [hereinafter cited as 1983 Statistical Data of 
the Uranium Industry]. 
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mining uranium is essentially the same as surface mining other 
minerals, it does require a larger amount of overburden removal.11 
Overburden is transported to a special retention area, where it is 
stored until used as backfill material in the final reclamation of the 
site. Once the overburden has been removed, the uranium ore body 
is excavated by heavy machinery and transported to the mill. Open 
pit mining is the preferred method when the ore body is less than 
three hundred feet below the surface, but has been employed for 
the mining of uranium ore as deep as five hundred feet.6 · 
When the uranium ore body is more than three hundred feet 
below the surface, the high cost of removing overburden usually 
requires the use of deep mining techniques. The precise method 
for extracting the uranium depends on the shape, size, altitude and 
grade of the ore body being mined, the ground stability, and the 
cost of extraction. When the ore is in small deposits, inclined en-
tries are made into canyon walls or sloping ground;7 for larger de-
posits at a depth of six hundred to fourteen hundred feet, vertical 
shafts are dug into the ground.8 Tunnels are dug from the shafts to 
reach the ore deposit. 
The ore body is then usually fractured by drilling and blasting 
with explosives. Once the ore is removed, tailings9 from the mining 
process can be backfilled along the mine walls, if the physical char-
acteristics of the ore body permit. This expedites reclamation of 
the mine and reduces the quantity of tailings that must be dis-
posed of at the surface. 
Where the low grade of the uranium ore body precludes the use 
of conventional mining methods, solution, or in situ, mining may 
be used. 10 Inflow wells are drilled into the ore body at a location 
upstream of a production weli. An acidic or alkaline leaching solu-
tion is injected into the ore body to dissolve the uranium. The so-
lution is pumped to the surface and the uranium extracted. This 
circular process of injection and removal is continued until the 
• 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Uranium Milling B-1 (September 1980) (Pub. No. NUREG-0706) [hereinafter cited as 2 
NRC FGEIS]. 
• Id . 
• ld. 
8 ld. 
• Tailings are the rock and mineral deposits which are removed from their natural envi-
ronment as waste materials during the mining of uranium and other minerals. 
10 In situ or solution mining constituted approximately 11% of uranium production in 
1983. 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 11 (Table 1-12). 
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level of uranium extracted from the solution is too low to continue 
leaching the ore body. The solution mining process eliminates the 
risks that conventional mining practices pose to workers and the 
large volume of tailings produced by conventional methods. How-
ever, it is feasible only where the ore lies in a generally horizontal 
bed below the static water table but above an impermeable rock 
layer, where the uranium minerals in the ore body are susceptible 
to leaching, and where the ore deposit is sufficiently extensive to 
justify the higher cost of this method of recovery.11 
A fourth method of uranium extraction is bore hole mining. 
Water is sprayed against the ore body with sufficient force to frac-
ture the ore. 12 This method is still experimental and has not yet 
been used in the United States. 
B. Uranium .l'vfilling Techniques 
After the uranium ore is mined, it is converted by milling into 
uranium oxide, U80 8 , a dry substance known as "yellowcake." The 
conventional milling process produces only one to five pounds of 
usable uranium oxide from each ton of ore. 
The conventional uranium milling process involves three steps. 
First, the uranium ore is blended to obtain uniform physical and 
chemical characteristics.18 Second, the ore is ground in a ball or 
rod mill, a water-filled rotating drum containing metal balls or 
rods.14 Finally, the uranium is extracted from the resulting pulp. 
Several procedures can be employed, depending on ore composi-
tion. Approximately eighty-two percent of current uranium milling 
capacity uses an "acid leach" process.111 When the ore contains 
more than twelve percent limestone, an alkaline leaching process is 
employed.16 The leaching process extracts most of the uranium · 
along with impurities. The uranium enriched solution is then sepa-
rated from the tailings solids. 
Where only low grade ore is available, or where the mine site is 
far from the mill and the ore body is not extensive, "heap leach-
ing" is sometimes used. Low grade sandstone uranium ores are 
" 2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-2. 
11 Rogers, Golden & Halpern, A Report on Proposed Uranium Mining in Virginia 28 
(1982). 
11 2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-2. 
•• /d. at B-4. When solution mining is used, there is no need for the crushing and grinding 
steps. 
•• /d. at B-5. 
•• /d. at B-7. 
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placed on a gently sloped, impermeable pad, and saturated from 
above with an acidic or alkaline leaching solution. A network of 
pipes and drain tiles collects the leachate as it percolates to the 
bottom of the ore pile. The leachate is recirculated until the con-
centration of uranium in the solution is sufficiently high for 
extraction. 
The solution produced in each of these processes is dewatered in 
thickeners and filtered. 17 The "filter cake" is dried to produce the 
yellowcake, containing ninety to ninety-eight percent uranium ox-
ide.18 The yellowcake is crushed and screened to the required size 
and placed in steel-reinforced drums, which are sealed and stored 
for shipping to a uranium enrichment facility. 19 
All commercial nuclear power installations in the United States 
are light-water reactors that use enriched uranium as the basic 
fuel. Uranium occurs naturally as two isotopes- uranium 235 and 
uranium 238 - in dramatically unequal amounts. Only 0. 71% of 
all uranium is the isotope U-235.20 The spontaneous fission reac-
tion requires a nuclear fuel containing approximately three percent 
U-235.21 This U-235 concentration is achieved by converting the 
uranium oxide into gaseous uranium hexafluoride, UF6 , and dif-
fusing the gas through a porous membrane to gain a U-235-en-
riched stream. 22 After enrichment, the uranium hexafluoride is 
converted into uranium oxide (U02 ) and formed into ceramic pel-
lets for fuel rod fabrication. 
C. Adverse Effects Of Uranium Mining and Milling 
Many of the environmental problems created by uranium mining 
and milling are common to other extractive industries: (1) disrup-
tion of the rural life-style, (2) adverse impact upon vegetation, 




•• J. Krenz, Energy: From Opulence to Sufficiency 149 (1980). 
•• ld. The fission process for each uranium atom produces a large amount of energy and 
approximately 2.5 neutrons. The energy heats a water coolant to produce steam that drives 
the turbines of a generator. The liberated neutrons bombard other fissile uranium atoms, 
perpetuating the process until the nuclear fuel is fully consumed or a moderator absorbs or 
slows down the high-velocity neutrons. ld. at 150-51. 
11 J. Duderstadt & C. Kikuchi, Nuclear Power: Technology on Trial 100-02 (1979). The 
U.S. Department of Energy operates three gaseous diffusion plants which enrich uranium 
for commercial power plants. Other methods of enrichment include gas centrifugation, laser 
excitation and electromagnetic separation. Jd. at 101. 
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scape and to local historic resources, (4) increase in noise and vi-
bration, (5) pollution of air and water and (6) risks of mine col-
lapse and explosion. Because the ore is radioactive, uranium 
production also presents a number of problems not encountered in 
the extraction of other minerals. 
The primary concern is human exposure to radioactive materials 
released in uranium development. Radon-222 gas, a uranium decay 
product, must be ventilated from the mine shafts of underground 
mines to prevent concentrations hazardous to the miners' health.23 
Non-occupational exposure is also a danger. Residents in the vicin-
ity of the planned uranium mine/mill· complex may be exposed to 
radiation through air, groundwater, or surface water 
contamination. 
The most serious problem, unique to production of radioactive 
materials, is that of long-term waste disposal. Since only four to 
five pounds of yellowcake is produced from each ton of ore, the 
quantity of tailings to be disposed of is tremendous. These radioac-
tive materials and toxic metals must be contained for extremely 
long periods of time. The adverse effects of uranium mill tailings 
mismanagement became painfully apparent during the late 1960s. 
For example, an estimated 300,000 metric tons of radiation-con-
taminated tailings from uranium mills in Grand Junction, Colo-
rado, had been used as fill material for roads and sewer construc-
tion, and as foundations for homes and office buildings. 24 Congress 
eventually established a financial assistance program and entered 
into a cooperative arrangement with the state of Colorado to de-
contaminate the Grand Junction tailings.211 Uranium mill tailings 
have been identified in construction fill material at at least six 
other sites. 26 
Uranium milling operations have also reportedly contaminated 
public water supplies and affected river flora and fauna. 27 The 
•• 2 NRC FGEIS, supra note 5, at B-1. 
.. These tailings, thought to be innocuous, had been donated by the Climax Uranium 
Company as a public service. Grammer, The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act 
of 1978 and NRC:s Agreement State Program, 13 Nat. Resources L. 469, 478 (1981). 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2017(c) (1982) authorizes the appropriation of funds to clean up contami-
nated sites. 
•• 1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on 
Uranium Milling 2-2 (September 1980) (Pub. No. NUREG-0706) [hereinafter cited as 1 
NRC FGEIS]. 
17 See Linker, Beers and Lash, Radioactive Waste: Gaps in the Regulatory System, 56 
Denver L.J. 1, 7 (1979) (describing contamination of the Animas River below Durango, 
Colorado). 
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most severe incident of such contamination occurred in 1979 at 
Church Rock, New Mexico, when a mill tailings impoundment 
burst and contaminated a river below the impoundment. Finding a 
safe disposal site and choosing a material effective for long-term 
containment of tailings are two difficult problems to resolve before 
authorizing uranium mining and milling. 
D. The Uranium Mining and Milling Industry 
The fortunes of the domestic uranium industry are best de-
scribed as cyclical. Following World War II, the quantity of ura-
nium ore received by uranium mills gradually increased, peaking in 
1980 at 16.7 million tons per year.28 At present, the uranium indus-
try is depressed. In 1980, 23,300 tons of uranium oxide were pro-
duced from all sources.29 Annual production fell to 13,400 tons in 
1982.30 This dramatic drop in production is the result of a severely 
depressed market for uranium fuel. Since the demand for electric-
ity has fallen significantly, the price of uranium source material 
has also decreased. The depressed uranium market is reflected in 
decreased uranium ore exploration, mining and milling. 
1. The Current Uranium Market 
Exploration activity is an important measure of the health of the 
uranium production industry. There are two types of exploration 
activity: exploratory drilling, a search for new deposits, and devel-
opment drilling, determining the size, shape, and grade of a known 
deposit. Over the last several years, exploration activity has signifi-
cantly decreased in both areas. Exploratory drilling declined from 
28.95 million drilling feet in 1978 to 4.23 million feet in 1982.31 De-
velopment drilling dropped from 19.15 million feet in 1978 to 1.13 
•• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 7 (Table I-6). The 
surge in prosperity of the industry at the time of the Second World War was caused by the 
government's procurement program. Government incentives proved so successful that, by 
the end of the 1950s, it became apparent that the uranium supply would soon exceed the 
AEC's demand. Consequently, the AEC continued its contracting at fixed levels, and gradu-
ally "stretched out" its buying until the end of procurement in 1970. This "stretch out" of 
uranium procurement gradually reduced the purchase of uranium oxide by the federal gov-
ernment so as to minimize adverse economic consequences to uranium suppliers. See 
Groves, Uranium Revisited, 13 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 87, 95-97 (1967); see also 1 NRC 
FGEIS, supra note 26, at 2-1 through 2-2. 
•• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 12 (Table I-13). 
80 ld. 
•• Id. at 55 (Table IX-1). 
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million feet in 1982.82 Even smaller exploration expenditures for 
1984 were estimated.33 Exploration expenditures will not increase 
' until producers are confident that the market for uranium will 
improve. 
Uranium mining has decreased significantly due to depressed 
market conditions. In 1981, two hundred fifty-four uranium mines 
were in operation, producing 19,600 tons of uranium oxide. 34 In 
1982, one hundred ninety-six mines were in operation.36 The more 
than twenty percent reduction in the number of operating mines 
reflects the depressed state of the uranium industry. 
As the demand for uranium fuel has declined, milling activity 
has also fallen. At the beginning of 1981, twenty-two conventional 
uranium mills were operating;38 by the end of 1982, only fourteen 
conventional mills were in operation, and these were operating at 
only sixty-four percent of capacity.37 Considering both active and 
inactive mills, the uranium milling industry was operating at forty-
five percent capacity during 1982.38 Many mills are still in opera-
tion solely because of long-term, high-priced contracts. 
2. Future Uranium Requirements 
As noted above, uranium oxide demand has decreased signifi-
cantly during the past several years. This is due to a reduction in 
electricity demand throughout the nation and the reduced attrac-
tiveness of nuclear production of electrical energy. Since nuclear 
power plants are the primary consumers of uranium fuel, the num-
ber of on-line nuclear power plants expected to be in service in the 
future is an indication of future uranium demand. 
As of December 31, 1982, eighty nuclear reactors were in com-
mercial operation, with a combined generating capacity of sixty-
four gigawatts (GWe). At that time sixty-five facilities were under 
construction. Of these sixty-five, forty-six were more than thirty 
percent complete.39 However, there have been no new orders for 
•• Id. 
•• Estimated expenditures for 1984 exploration were 34 million dollars for 2.9 million feet 
of drilling. Id. at 58 (Table IV-4) . 
.. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry 18, 20 (1982) (Pub. No. 
GJ0-100) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry]. 
aa 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 11 (Table 1-12). 
aa 1982 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 34, at 49. 
87 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 45 (Table VII-3) . 
.. ld. 
•• ld. at 69, Table XII-9. 
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nuclear power plants since 1978. In fact, from 1978 through 1982, 
orders for sixty-two nuclear power facilities in the United States 
were cancelled.40 It is difficult to determine how many of the plants 
presently under construction will actually be completed or to pro-
ject the precise capacity of nuclear generating plants at any point 
in the future. The most recent Department of Energy forecasts 
project U.S. nuclear generating capacity to be eighty-seven GWe in 
1985 and 133 GWe in the year 2000.41 
It is difficult to predict the nuclear power capacity that will 
come on line in the future, and it is even more difficult to project 
future uranium needs. The Department of Energy (DOE) has pre-
dicted a rise in domestic demand for uranium oxide from 12,800 
tons in 1982 to 28,100 tons in 2000.42 However, it seems unlikely 
that new uranium sources will be necessary, since ore will be avail-
able through existing sources in the western states and through 
foreign procurement. 
The DOE estimates predict a much more modest increase in nu-
clear power production over the next two decades than was pre-
dicted ten years ago. In view of these forecasts, it may seem sur-
prising that the discovery ·of uranium ore deposits has generated 
such great interest among mining companies, in particular, Marline 
Oil Corporation. However, Marline asserted that it was optimistic 
about the investment potential in low cost domestic uranium re-
sources for the following reasons: (1) domestic production of ura-
nium during 1984 was expected to decrease to less than fifty per-
cent of domestic consumption due to a steady depletion . of low 
cost, high grade reserves, (2) foreign sources of uranium supply 
were unreliable because of economic and political factors, (3) do-
mestic consumption of uranium was expected to increase approxi-
mately fifty percent by 1989 as a result of over thirty new reactors 
being brought on line over the next three to four years, and ( 4) 
there was little or no new uranium exploration and development 
activity currently underway in the United States and, thus, no ap-
parent new domestic sources of supply sufficient to meet expected 
increases in demand for uranium.43 
•• ld. at 68, Table XII-8. 
•• ld. at 68, Table XII-7. 
•• Massachusetts Institute of Technology, International Energy Studies Program 2 (1982). 
•• Marline Shareholder Report, supra note 2, at 11-13. 
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3. Potential Economic Benefits of a Virginia Uranium Industry 
Despite projections of a depressed future for the uranium indus-
try, proponents of mining in Pittsylvania County project signifi-
cant economic benefits for Virginia."" They assert that the uranium 
industry can operate in relative safety and can provide significant 
societal benefits. Successful operation of the Marline project would 
add an estimated thirty million tons of uranium ore to domestic 
supply over a thirteen-year period. This would have a moderating 
effect on uranium prices and could reduce dependence on foreign 
source material. 
Marline has estimated the economic and employment benefits of 
uranium production in Pittsylvania County. Mine/mill complex 
construction expenses have been estimated at $82.4 million for mill 
process and open pit mining equipment, building materials and 
supplies, excavation, concrete, electrical equipment, site prepara-
tion, and engineering work. Forty-five percent of these expendi-
tures are expected to be made within the Pittsylvania County area, 
thereby benefitting the local economy. The work force required for 
construction will number 315, and will draw $5.1 million in wages 
over an eighteen-month period. During the thirteen-year opera-
tional phase, the uranium project is expected to employ 453 per-
sons who will be paid annual wages of $5.9 million (1981 dollars). 
Beyond labor costs, the mine/mill proponents project local 
spending of $8.8 million for energy, goods, and miscellaneous ex-
penses. Direct tax revenues to Pittsylvania and Halifax Counties 
and the city of Danville attributable to the plant have been esti-
mated at $417,000 per year. The state would also benefit from sev-
erance taxes on uranium production. 
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF URANIUM MINING AND MILLING 
The element uranium was discovered in 1789; its radioactivity 
was not discovered until 1896. Uranium was produced in the 
United States during the earlier part of this century as a by-
product of vanadium mining. The discovery in 1938 that bom-
barding the nucleus of the uranium atom with neutrons yielded 
tremendous energy led to the element's most significant 
•• The information in this and the following two paragraphs is cited from Marline/ 
Umetco, Technical Summary and 1984 Supplement with Supporting Technical Memoranda 
IV-46·47 (August 1984). 
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application. 411 
A. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act 
The Atomic Energy Act of 194646 was the first legislation to deal 
with the post-war consequences of nuclear energy. Because the 
original application of atomic energy was military, the federal gov-
ernment initially granted itself a monopoly over the nuclear power 
industry. Under the Act, the federal government retained the con-
trol it had assumed over the nuclear energy industry and conferred 
the responsibility of regulating and promoting the industry to a 
civilian agency, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). Federal 
control over atomic energy was thus complete.47 
Under the Act, the AEC was to administer domestic control over 
atomic energy materials48 and carry on research, production, and 
development programs. 49 The Commission was also charged with 
encouraging and supporting private research and development. &0 
Much of the actual work on atomic energy was performed for the 
government by private contractors.111 Nevertheless, the 1946 Act 
sought to create a government monopoly in the field of atomic en-
ergy. The 1946 Act provided that the federal government would 
retain ownership of all fissionable materials112 and related produc-
•• The construction of atomic weapons in the World War II era required a supply of 
fissionable materials not readily available in the United States. Uranium ore used in con-
structing American atomic weapons came from deposits in the Belgian Congo and Canada. 
To supplement these foreign sources, uranium ore was procured from vanadium mines and 
old tailings dumps in Colorado. 1 NRC FGEIS, supra note 26, at 2-1. 
•• Pub. L. No. 79-585, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011-2296 (1982)). 
•• During the 1950s there was considerable interest in permitting the state governments 
to enter the field of nuclear regulation. A number of commentators wrote in support of 
allowing the states to regulate at least some aspect of the atomic energy industry. See Krebs 
& Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 Law & Contemp. Probs. 
182 (1956); Parker, The Need for State Atomic Energy Programs in the West, 29 Rocky 
Mt. L. Rev. 296 (1957); Frampton, Radiation Exposure - the Need for a National Policy, 
10 Stan. L. Rev. 7 (1957). 
•• The 1946 Act § 5(a)-(c). 
•• /d. § 3(a); S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5, reprinted in 1946 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 1327, 1329-31. 
110 The 1946 Act § 3(a). The conflict between promotional activities and regulatory activi-
ties was remedied in 1974 by dividing the AEC into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and the Energy Research and Development Administration. 
•• Prior to 1954, 95% of total federal government expenditures on atomic energy were 
through private contractors. Parker, supra note 47, at 301. In addition, during this period 
there were about 150,000 persons employed in the atomic energy program, of which contrac-
tor employees accounted for about 142,000. Id; see also Frampton, supra note 47, at 17. 
•• The 1946 Act § 5(a)(2). The Act provided that "fissionable materials means plutonium, 
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tion facilities. 63 The Act specifically prohibited private ownership 
of fissionable materials without AEC authorization. 64 Although the 
1946 Act gave the AEC the power to control the possession and 
transfer of source materials, 66 Congress did not extend the govern-
mental monopoly to the ownership of source materials. 66 
More importantly, the 1946 Act excluded the power to regulate 
uranium and thorium mining from the extensive authority that it 
conferred on the federal government. The AEC's licensing and reg-
ulatory responsibilities were not to apply to "any source material 
prior to removal from its place of deposit in nature."67 The legisla-
tive history of the 1946 Act makes it clear that Congress sought to 
leave the mining and exploration for uranium ore in the hands of 
private enterprise. 68 During the 1950s, the federal government not 
only permitted private miners to supply source materials, but also 
created incentives to encourage uranium mining. 69 Thus, the early 
statutory structure placed uranium mining outside the scope of 
federal regulatory control and left it, presumably, to the states. 
This regulatory structure is reflected in current federal statutory 
and administrative policy.60 
B. The 1954 Atomic Energy Act 
The Atomic Energy Act of 195461 was the culmination of several 
uranium enriched in the isotope 235, any other material which the commission determines 
to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through a nuclear chain reaction 
of the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing; but does not 
include source materials." ld. § 5(a)(l). 
•• Id. § 4(c). See generally Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in 
the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 
392, 394 (1976) . 
.. Id. § 5(a)(2). 
•• Id. § 5(b)(2). 
"" ld. § 5(a)(3). Source materials were defined by the 1946 Act to include uranium, tho-
rium and ores containing these two substances in certain concentrations set by the Commis-
sion. ld. § 5(b)(l). In fact, the statutory definition of "fissionable materials" explicitly ex-
cluded source materials. ld. § 5(a)(l). 
•• Id. § 5(b)(l), (4). 
08 S. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946). 
•• See supra note 28. 
•• NRC regulations require a license for source material only "after removal from its place 
of deposit in nature." See 10 C.F.R. § 40.3 (1982). This interpretation of agency regulatory 
jurisdiction has been recognized in passing by the federal courts and the NRC. See Home-
stake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continental Explo.ration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 791 (lOth Cir. 1960); In 
re Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp., 8 N.R.C. 551, 554 (1978). 
11 Pub. L. No. 83-703, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2011-2296 (1982)). 
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years of effort on the part of Congress to open the emerging nu-
clear technology to the private sector.62 At the same time, the Act 
established a comprehensive program of federal licensing and regu-
lation. The Act gave the AEC broad licensing and regulatory au-
thority over the possession, transfer and use of source materials,63 
special nuclear materials,64 and byproduct materials.66 The 1954 
Act also empowered the AEC to license construction and operation 
of facilities that would produce and use special nuclear material.66 
The statute made no provision for state regulation of byproduct, 
source, or special nuclear materials. 67 
Under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the federal government be-
•• By 1954 Congress had recognized that technological advances in both military and 
peaceful applications of atomic energy required major changes in the framework of the 1946 
legislation. See S. Rep. No. 1699, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 3456, 3457-59. The AEC, through the efforts of private industrial con-
tractors, had developed breeder reactors that made nuclear generated electricity feasible for 
public consumption. ld. at 3458. 
•• The Act defined "source material" as "(1) uranium, thorium or any other material 
which is determined by the Commission ... to be source material; or (2) ores containing one 
or more of the foregoing materials, in such concentration as the Commission may by regula-
tion determine from time to time." The 1954 Act § 11(s) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2014(z) 
(1982)). NRC regulations define source material as "(1) uranium or thorium, or any combi-
nation thereof, in physical or chemical form or (2) ores which contain by weight one-twenti-
eth of one percent (0.05%) or more of (i) uranium, (ii) thorium, or (iii) any combination 
thereof." 10 C.F.R. § 40.4 (1982). The apparent intention is to extend licensing and regula-
tory jurisdiction only to mined ore which has reached a milling site for processing into 
yellowcake. 
84 The Act defines "special nuclear material" as "(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the 
isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, and any other material which the commis-
sion ... determines to be special nuclear material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by 
any of the foregoing, but does not include source material." The 1954 Act§ 11(0 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2014(aa) (1982)). 
•• The 1954 Act§§ 51-82 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2114 (1982)). The Act 
defines byproduct material as "any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) 
yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of pro-
ducing or utilizing special nuclear material." ld. § ll(e) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
2014(e) (1982)). 
88 ld. §§ 41-44 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2061-64 (1982)). 
•• One commentator has noted: 
The only conclusion which can be drawn from the 1954 Act in regard to the allocation 
of federal and state responsibility for the regulation of source, special nuclear and by-
product materials. . .is that the preoccupation of Congress with the readjustment of 
the relation of the federal government and private industry in the development of 
atomic energy foreclosed consideration of the possibility of state regulation, other 
than traditional regulation of electric power. In ignoring such matters, Congress sim-
ply reflected the reality that there was little or no interest in state regulation of this 
new federal preserve. 
Murphy & La Pierre, supra note 53, at 397-98. See also Cavers, State Responsibility in the 
Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29 (1961). 
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came actively involved in acquiring source materials.68 The AEC 
encouraged both prospecting for new uranium sources and mining 
of uranium when located. It protected a locator's rights to mining 
claims, resolved conflicts between miners, conducted its own ex-
ploratory drilling, built access roads to lightly prospected areas on 
federal lands, withdrew large areas of federal lands from settle-
ment,69 and performed aerial surveys.70 The AEC's direct purchase 
of source material created a boom in uranium production in the 
western states. 71 
The most important of the government-created incentives for 
uranium ore production were financial. The AEC established guar-
anteed minimum prices for its purchases of uranium ores. 72 Explo-
ration was also subsidized by financial aid from the Defense Min-
erals Exploration Administration, which granted to qualified 
. applicants seventy-five percent of the cost of uranium 
exploration. 73 
88 From 1948 to 1971, the Atomic Energy Commission purchased 173,665 tons of uranium 
concentrate from private suppliers. 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra 
note 4, at 72 (Table A-2). The price paid by the AEC has varied considerably, from $12.35 
per pound in 1953, to $5.54 per pound in 1971. /d. Direct annual purchases of uranium 
concentrate by the AEC peaked at slightly more than 17,600 tons in 1961 and dropped to 
4,010 tons in 1970. /d. 
•• For instance, between 1948 and 1954 the Atomic Energy Commission stimulated the 
discovery and production of uranium by withdrawing from settlement 982 square miles of 
public land in Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. See Palmer, Problems Arising 
out of Public Land Withdrawals of the Atomic Energy Commission, 2 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. 
Inst. 77, 86 (1956). 
70 These incentives appear to have succeeded. It was estimated that the number of ura-
nium miners grew from 50 in 1949 to 5000 in 1955. See Tippit, Federal Incentives to Ura-
nium Mining, 27 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 457, 465 (1955). . 
71 One lawyer in Utah during the mid 1950s compared the uranium mining boom in that 
state to the nineteenth century silver and gold discoveries in Cripple Creek, Leadville, and 
Virginia City. See Melich, Some Interesting Sidelights in the Development of the Uranium 
Industry, 27 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 451, 456 · (1955). 
•• See Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3, 13 Fed. Reg. 2090 (1948); Domestic Uranium 
Circular No. 5, Revised, 16 Fed. Reg. 2333 (1951); see also supra note 68. 
71 See Tippit, supra note 70, at 458. Despite the encouragement of Congress, private utili-
ties had little incentive to participate in the nation's atomic energy program, for two rea-
sons. First, producing electricity via nuclear reactors did not prove to be lucrative. The first 
civilian nuclear power plant, completed in 1957 by the Westinghouse Company and oper-
ated for the federal government at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, produced electricity at ten 
times the cost of coal or oil powered generators. P. Pringle & J. Speigelman, The Nuclear 
Barons 160-62 (1981). Second, utility companies feared incurring liability in case of a cata-
strophic reactor accident. No utility wanted to be exposed to the risk of defending the per-
sonal injury and property damage claims that might result from a core melt-down. See S. 
Rep. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess 1-3, reprinted in 1957 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1803, 
1803-05. 
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy conducted hearings in the spring of 1956 and 
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C. 1959 Amendments to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act 
Following the enactment of the 1954 Act, the states demon-
strated an interest in regulating and licensing the atomic energy 
industry. Protection of the public health and safety from perceived 
radiation hazards fell within the traditional domain of state police 
powers. Many states established advisory commissions on atomic 
energy and registration requirements for radiation sources.74 
In 1959, Congress amended the 1954 Act by adding section 274,711 
creating the AEC's Agreement State Program. The program was 
designed to permit state participation in regulating a limited seg-
ment of the nuclear industry, while insuring that this participation 
would not conflict with the power of the AEC. Congress intended 
to have nuclear material licensed and regulated either by the AEC, 
or by state and local government, but not by both. 76 
Under the Agreement State Program, AEC was authorized to 
enter into agreements with states to relinquish, rather than dele-
gate, its authority. Thereafter, the agreement state would assume 
full regulatory authority over uranium mining and milling,77 source 
materials, byproduct materials, and special nuclear materials (col-
lectively called "agreement materials"), as long as these materials 
were in quantities insufficient to form a critical mass.78 Thus, sec-
determined that "the problem of liability has become a major roadblock." I d. at 1803. In the 
summer of 1956, the Atomic Energy Commission was directed by the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy to prepare a study on the possible consequences of a total core melt-down. 
The "worst case scenario" predicted property damage approaching $7 billion in 1956 dollars. 
Id. at 1803-04. 
In an effort to ensure the participation of private utilities in the nuclear energy program, 
and to provide' protection to persons who might be injured in a catastrophic reactor acci-
dent, Congress enacted an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act, the Price-Anderson Act, 
Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 
(1982)). This amendment placed a ceiling on the liability of a utility for the damages caused 
by a single nuclear accident. 
" See Frampton, supra note 47, at 29-40. · 
70 Act of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, 73 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 42 
u.s.c. § 2021 (1982)). 
78 S. Rep. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Seas. 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. 
News 2878-2880 (comments by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (1982). It must be recalled that under the AEC's interpretation of 
its jurisdiction, all states. possessed the authority to regulate the mining of uranium ore. See 
supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. 
78 Id. § 2021(b),(c). The first state to enter into an agreement with the Atomic Energy 
Commission was Kentucky, on March 26, 1962. California became the second agreement 
state on September 1, 1962. For effective dates of agreement of all agreement states, see 
National Governors' Association Committee on Energy and Environment, The Agreement 
State Program: A State Perspective B-1 (January 1983) [hereinafter cited as Governors' 
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tion 27 4 offered agreement states a large degree of independence 
free from significant federal oversight. 79 
Participation in the Agreement State Program entails two steps. 
First, the state governor must certify that the state is willing to 
assume regulation of nuclear materials, and that the state "has a 
program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect 
the public health and safety."80 This certification must be accom-
panied by state enabling legislation authorizing the governor to 
enter into an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC).81 Second, the NRC must determine that the state's radia-
tion safety program is in accordance with the requirements of sub-
section (o) of section 2021, is adequate to protect the public health 
and safety, and is "coordinated and compatible" with the AEC's 
regulatory program. 82 The drafters of section· 27 4 believed that this 
terminology would lessen "the dangers of conflicting, overlapping, 
and inconsistent standards in different jurisdictions, to the hin-
drance of industry and jeopardy of public safety."83 
The Atomic Energy Commission retained jurisdiction over cer-
tain activities which Congress believed were too hazardous to be 
Report). 
•• It is ironic that the Atomic Energy Act granted the states wide latitude with regard to 
source material recovery, yet attempted to centralize control of nuclear power plant licens-
ing in the federal government. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court has 
rejected the notion of absolute federal preemption of nuclear power plant licensing. See 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713 
(1983) (upholding the state interest in regulating or temporarily excluding nuclear power 
plants) . 
•• 42 u.s.c. § 2021(d)(1) (1982). 
•• In 1974, Congress divided the AEC into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responsi-
ble for regulatory activities, and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 
with authority over promotional activities. 
81 I d. § 2021(d)(2) & (g). The original regulations implementing the agreement states pro-
gram, published in 1961, required state standards governing radiation exposure levels to be 
uniform with the corresponding federal standards. 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). The NRC no 
longer requires that the states' programs be identical to that of the federal agency: 
ldenticality, while theoretically possible, can never be achieved because of variations 
in interpretation and enforcement. The advisory committee members agreed that 
identicality was not only impossible but also ill-advised. States must retain the capa-
bility to respond to local or changing circumstances. As another committee member 
noted, rigid rules may also stymie innovation. 
Governors' Report, supra note 78, at 39. 
•• S. Rep. No. 870, supra note 76, at 8-9, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
at 2879. The AEC regulations implementing the Agreement State Program indicated that 
state radiation protection standards must be uniform with those issued by the Commission. 
See 26 Fed. Reg. 2537 (1961). 
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exempted from the Commission's exclusive control.8" These activi-
ties include the construction and operation of reactors, the import 
and export of reactors, the sea disposal of nuclear waste, and the 
disposal of any nuclear material which the AEC determines to be 
hazardous. 811 Under the 1959 Amendments, the Commission also 
retained the authority to license the sale and distribution of any 
item containing source, byproduct, or special nuclear material, not-
withstanding an agreement with the state. 
The Amendments provided that if the AEC determined that a 
state was not adequately protecting the public from radiation, the 
Commission could reacquire authority over the licensing or regula-
tion of nuclear material by terminating or suspending its agree-
ment with the state. 86 In 1980, the Atomic Energy Act was 
amended to permit the NRC to temporarily suspend all or part of 
an agreement without notice or hearing, and reassert temporary 
control over matters previously within its exclusive jurisdiction 
when an emergency exists and the state has not promptly and ef-
fectively eliminated the danger.87 Taken together, these two provi-
sions accord the NRC the ultimate discretion to temporarily or 
permanently supplant state regulation of agreement materials. 
D. The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 
Throughout the 1960s there was virtually no federal or state reg-
ulation of the disposal of uranium mill tailings. 88 The sufficiency of 
84 ld. at 10, reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2880-81. 
•• 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1982). 
•• ld. § 2021(j)(1). The drafters of section 274 clearly intended that this reserved power 
be exercised only in the most extreme circumstances. S. Rep. No. 870, supra note 76, at 12, 
reprinted in 1959 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2882. 
•• Act of June 30, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-295, title II, § 205, 94 Stat. 287 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2021(j)(2) (1982)). This section was intended to give the NRC additional flexibility 
in dealing with emergencies on an expedited basis. The conference report noted, "[t]he con-
ferees recognized that in those rare instances in which an emergency requires NRC to exer-
cise authority the current statutory mechanism is too cumbersome and slow to protect pub-
lic health and safety." H.R. Rep. No. 1070, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1980). 
•• The House report on H.R. 13650, which would become the Uranium Mill Tailings Ra-
diation Control Act, noted: 
From the early 1940's through the early 1970's there was little official recognition of 
the hazards presented by these tailings. Federal regulation of the industry was mini-
mal. As a consequence, mill tailings were left at sites, mostly in the Southwest, in an 
unstabilized and unprotected condition. Some of these tailings were used for con-
struction purposes in the foundations and walls of private and public buildings. 
There, through the concentrated emission of radon gas, the hazard of tailings and 
public exposure increased substantially. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
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the agreement states' supervision of uranium mining and milling 
activities came into question during the 1970s, when a number of 
serious environmental problems arose, involving the operation of 
uranium production facilities. After an unusual legislative pro-
cess,89 Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Act of 197890 in 
response to the deficiencies of the Agreement State Program in 
dealing with these problems. 
Title I of the Act created "a program of assessment and remedial 
action at [inactive] sites ... in order to stabilize and control such 
tailings in a safe and environmentally sound manner and to mini-
mize or eliminate radiation health hazards to the public."91 Title II 
established "a program to regulate mill tailings during uranium or 
thorium ore processing at active mill operations and after termina-
tion of such operations."92 This title significantly changed the fed-
eral power to regulate uranium mill tailings, and restructured the 
Agreement State Program.93 
Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Act produced four major 
changes in federal regulation of uranium mining and milling. First, 
by extending the definition of "byproduct material" to include 
"the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration 
of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its 
source material content,"9" Congress extended the NRC's authority 
to the regulation of wastes produced with source material. 911 The 
7433, 7434; see also id. at 26-28 (documenting lack of concern and minimal early federal 
role). 
•• The Committee action on proposals dealing with the uranium mill tailings was shared 
in the House by the Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs and the Subcommittee 
on Energy and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The result of 
this committee action was H. R. Rep. No. 1480, Pts. 1 and 2, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). 
Oddly enough, there were no Senate committee reports on this legislation or similar legisla-
tion and there was no conference report. The Uranium Mill Tailings Act was passed during 
the final moments of the 95th Congress and this hurried consideration evidently resulted in 
numerous errors in drafting. See Grammer, supra note 24, at 480. 
00 Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978) (codified as amended at Title 42 (1982)). 
01 42 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(1) (1982). The statute identified twenty-two abandoned sites in 
need of remedial action. I d. § 7912(a)(l). EPA issued regulations for inactive site cleanup in 
1980, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 190.10-.21 (1982), and proposed tailings disposal standards in 1981, 
see 46 Fed. Reg. 2893 (1981). Final rules were issued in 1983 . 
.. 42 u.s.c. § 7901(b)(2). 
•• The Act also contains a Title III, which requires the NRC to study active uranium mill 
sites in New Mexico to determine whether further remedial steps are necessary.ld. §§ 7941-
42 . 
.. ld. § 2014(e). 
•• ld. § 2111; see also Note, The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Act of 1978, 8 Ecology 
L.Q. 801 (1980). 
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NRC was instructed to insure the management of uranium mill 
tailings in a manner it deemed "appropriate to protect the public 
health and safety and the environment from radiological and 
nonradiological hazards associated with the processing and with 
the possession and transfer of such material. "96 
Second, the 1978 Act required the NRC to develop decontamina-
tion, decommissioning and reclamation standards to be imposed 
upon mill licensees during the operation of the mill.97 The Act also 
required that the land used for mill tailings disposal, as well as the 
tailings themselves, be transferred to the United States or the state 
in which the land is located.98 The legislation empowered the NRC 
to require the governmental entity to "undertake such monitoring, 
maintenance, and emergency measures as are necessary to protect 
the public health and safety."99 The burden of responsibility over 
long term maintenance could be a major consideration in a state's 
determination of whether to accept custody of tailings sites. The 
Act also required "an adequate bond, surety, or other financial ar-
rangement" be provided by the uranium mill licensee "to permit 
the completion of all requirements established by the Commission 
for the decontamination, decommissioning, and reclamation of 
sites, structures, and equipment used in conjunction with by-
product material."100 The provision does not preclude state and lo-
cal governments from establishing independent bonding 
requirements. 
Third, the Act established a cooperative relationship between 
the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regard-
ing the promulgation and enforcement of environmental standards 
regulating uranium mill tailings at both inactive and active tailings 
sites. EPA was commanded to propose and, within eleven months 
thereafter, to promulgate standards "for the protection of the pub-
lic health, safety, and the environment from radiological and 
nonradiological hazards associated with the processing and with 
the possession, transfer, and the disposal of byproduct mate-
rial."101 EPA's role is to set standards, not to enforce them. The 
" 42 U.S.C. § 2114(a)(1). 
17 ld. § 2113(a)(1). 
18 ld. § 2113(b)(1)(A). 
88 Jd. § 2113(b)(5). 
100 Jd. § 2201(x)(1). 
101 ld. § 2022(b)(1). Unfortunately, these EPA rules were not established within the 11-
month time frame set up by the Uranium Mill Tailings Act. The EPA rules were finally 
proposed on April 29, 1983, nearly three years later than the statute required. In May 1983, 
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statute clearly allocates the responsibility for implementing and 
enforcing the EPA standards to the NRC and to those agreement 
states that assume control over uranium milling operations.102 
Fourth, the 1978 Uranium Mill Tailings Act amended the 1959 
Act to permit agreement states to regulate not only the source 
materials, but also the tailings produced by the uranium milling 
process. 103 An agreement state must comply with the requirements 
of the statute regarding the ownership of mill tailings and mill tail-
ings disposal sites. The state must also adopt standards "for the 
protection of the public health, safety, and the environment, from 
hazards associated with [uranium mill tailings] which are 
equivalent to, to the extent practicable, or more stringent than, 
standards adopted and enforced by the [NRC]."10" The ability to 
regulate uranium milling with standards that exceed federal min-
ima makes agreement affiliation more attractive to a state con-
cerned about the leniency of federal standards. 
The Act established certain administrative procedures.for li<;ens-
ing and rulemaking with which agreement states licensing uranium 
milling operations must comply .. When a mill license is sought, 
state law must provide an opportunity for written comments, a 
public hearing, and a written determination subject to judicial re-
view.10G In addition, the state must prepare a written analysis of 
environmental effects for "each license which has a significant im-
pact on the human environment," that must be available to the 
general public prior to the licensing hearing!08 The state must pro-
vide for public participation in rulemaking through either a public 
hearing or the submission of written comments and for judicial re~ 
view of any rules. 107 In this manner, Congress sought to ensure that 
the mill licensing ·activities and the administrative practices of 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a proposed suspension of selected pQrtions. of its 
own mill licensing regulations, located at 10 C.F.R. pt. 40 (1982), once the EPA-proposed 
general environmental standards became final. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,649 (1983). On August 4, 
1983, this proposed suspension of NRC rules became final with only two changes. 48 Fed. 
Reg. 35,350 (1983). 
101 42 u.s.c. § 2022(d). 
108 Id. § 2022(b)(l). 
104 I d. § 2021(o)(2). The 1983 NRC Appropriations Act amended the Tailings Act to per-
mit uranium mill licensees to "take into account local or regional conditions, including geol-
ogy, topography, hydrology and meteorology" in proposing mill tailing disposal methods al-
ternative to those required by the NRC. Pub. L. No. 97-415, § 20, 96 Stat. 2067, 2079 (1983) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2114(c) (1982)). 
100 42 U.S.C. § 2021(o)(3)(A). 
, .. Id. § 2021(o)(3)(C). 
101 Jd. § 2021(o)(3)(B). 
102 Virginia Journal of Natural Resources Law [Vol. 4:81 
agreement states would be open to public scrutiny and criticism. 
III. STATE PARTICIPATION IN REGULATING THE URANIUM MINING 
AND MILLING INDUSTRY 
A. The Agreement State Program: Costs and Benefits 
Despite its complete regulatory control over the licensing of ura-
nium mills, the NRC has never asserted jurisdiction over uranium 
ore mining. States have retained control over uranium mining as 
an aspect of their regulation of conventional mining activities. The 
Agreement State Program provides a means of consolidating regu-
lation over the two activities. Combining the power relinquished by 
the NRC over uranium milling with traditional state regulation of 
uranium mining, a comprehensive scheme of state regulation can 
be achieved. By 1983, twenty-six states had elected through the 
Agreement State Program to assume some facet of the NRC's reg-
ulatory authority.108 Agreement states now issue nearly sixty per-
cent of all the radioactive materials licenses granted in the United 
States.109 
Domestic uranium production has been limited almost exclu-
sively to the western states of New Mexico, Wyoming, and 
Texas.110 In 1983, sixty-six percent of the uranium mined in the 
United States was removed from the Colorado Plateau and the 
Wyoming Basins.111 Yet, states with no uranium production indus-
try have adopted regulatory policies concerning the industry. 
States have adopted four basic approaches to regulating uranium 
mining and milling. Four of the most productive states - Texas, 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Washington- regulate uranium mill-
ing under agreement with the NRC.112 These states comprehen-
sively license and regulate both uranium mining and milling. One 
non-agreement state, Wyoming, licenses uranium mining and regu-
108 The agreement states are: Kentucky, California, Mississippi, New York, Texas, Arkan-
sas, Florida, North Carolina, Kansas, Oregon, Tennessee, New Hampshire, Alabama, Ne-
braska, Washington, Arizona, Louisiana, Colorado, Idaho, North Dakota, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. The agreement states with 
uranium mill regulations are New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Oregon, Washington and 
Califronia. Governors' Report, supra note 78, at B-1. 
108 /d. at 10. 
110 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 8-9 (Tables 1-7 and I-
S). 
111 /d. at 9 (Table 1-9). 
111 Three agreement states, Arizona, Idaho, and Nebraska, have returned their uranium 
mill licensing authority to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. at 31 n.13. 
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lates a number of nonradiological aspects of uranium milling. An-
other non-agreement state, Utah, regulates the mining of uranium 
ore but not milling.us Finally, at least four states (Vermont, New 
Jersey, New York and Minnesota) have discouraged uranium pro-
duction altogether by adopting restrictive legislation. 
Before discussing the technical requirements for becoming an 
agreement state, it is worth noting the major arguments for and 
against participation in the program. First, agreement state status 
is desirable to a state that wishes to maximize its control over this 
potentially hazardous industry. The agreement state program per-
mits the state to unify its regulation of radioactive materials in one 
agency and thereby undertake a comprehensive regulatory ap-
proach toward related public health and safety matters. The agree-
ment states are thought to be more responsive to local conditions 
and the needs of their citizens, and therefore are better able to 
provide monitoring and inspection services than would be the fed-
eral government. Since the agreement state has taken direct re-
sponsibility over enumerated radiological materials, it can identify 
emergency situations more quickly and respond to them more ef-
fectively. Second, while agreement state status does not make that 
state eligible for federal financial assistance, it does allow state em-
ployees to receive NRC training in specialized areas of radiological 
protection. This training can develop highly competent state per-
sonnel to implement the agreement program. Third, an agreement 
state can consolidate an industry's radiological and nonradiological 
permitting requirements into one streamlined permit process, sav-
ing both the applicants and the state substantial time and money. 
The cost is the primary disadvantage of becoming an agreement 
state. The cost of an agreement state's radiation control program 
varies with the extent of the functions assumed by the state and 
the size and complexity of the responsible state agency. A state 
may embark on a limited or a comprehensive agreement program. 
Agreement states regulating uranium milling have extensive pro-
grams. The cost of administering an agreement program can range 
from $100,000 to over $3 million per year.114 Despite the costliness 
m Utah has commenced negotiations with the NRC regarding agreement status, yet does 
not wish to regulate uranium mill licensing. See 49 Fed. Reg. 978 (1984). 
"' More than half of the twenty-six agreement states spend between $100,000 and 
$500,000 per year on their programs. Four agreement states allocate from $500,000 to $1 
million per year, while two states grant between $1 million and $3 million per year. One 
state spends more than $3 million per year while no state spends less than $100,000. Gover-
nors' Report, supra note 78, at 29 (Table 10). 
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of implementing the Agreement State Program, the number of 
agreement states has increased. The NRC has reported that four 
more states - Iowa, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Utah - are cur-
rently discussing the possibility of agreement state status with the 
NRC. m This indication of interest reflects efforts by the federal 
government to encourage agreement status. It also demonstrates 
the willingness of the states to expand their own regulatory agen-
cies. It should be noted, however, that none of these four states is 
seeking to regulate uranium milling and mill tailings. 
B. . NRC Regulations Governing the Agreement State Program 
The Agreement State Program technically requires the NRC to 
relinquish certain areas of its authority after the NRC and a par-
ticipating state have reached formal agreement on the state's regu-
latory program. In practice, a section 274 agreement is arrived at 
only after lengthy negotiation between the state and the federal 
government. A state wishing to regulate uranium milling opera-
tions, low level waste material or permanent disposal facilities 
must become an agreement state. Once a state has entered the 
Agreement State Program, it may decrease its range of authority 
or it may leave the program altogether.1111 The NRC has estab-
lished a set of general criteria for states wishing to become agree-
ment states. In 1981, additional criteria were added for states wish-
ing to regulate uranium milling and tailings in order to conform 
with the requirements of the 1978 Uranium Mill Tailings Act. 
1. General Criteria for Agreement State Approval 
The state regulatory program must include standards for protec-
tion against radiation. To achieve uniformity among states con-
cerning maximum permissible radiation levels, the state regula-
tions must be based on the NRC's standards governing maximum 
permissible radiation levels and radioactivity concentrations.t17 
110 Id. at 7 n.l. 
118 The NRC encourages a state to regulate as many of the agreement materials as possi-
ble in order to limit the total accumulated occupational radiation exposure to individuals. 46 
Fed. Reg. 7540 (1981). The agency makes clear, however, that a comprehensive program "is 
not ... a necessary or appropriate subject for coverage in the criteria." Id. at 7540-41. Re-
cently, three agreement states, Arizona, Idaho and Nebraska, have relinquished regulatory 
authority over uranium mill tailings to the NRC. Governors' Report, supra note 78, at 31 
n.13. 
117 46 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7541 (1981) (criterion 3). These standards are set out in 10 C.F.R. 
pt. 20 (1983). This section of the NRC regulations creates rules regarding permissible doses, 
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These standards govern the waste disposal into air, waters, sewers 
and soil. The state must also require licensees to maintain radia-
tion exposure records, report accidents, and notify employees of 
excessive radiation exposure.118 The state regulatory authority 
must monitor the radiation exposure of personnel and conduct in-
spections of all licensed facilities; 119 the criteria do not explicitly 
stipulate the frequency of inspection.120 
The general criteria set forth the minimum training required of 
regulatory and inspection personnel. The NRC recommends that 
personnel who perform evaluation and inspection functions hold a 
bachelor's degree or equivalent in the physical and/or life sciences, 
including biology, chemistry, physics, and engineering and have 
training and experience in radiation protection.m The general cri-
teria do not establish specific levels of staffing in the agreement 
states' regulatory agencies; the level of staffing is apparently deter-
mined through negotiation between the agreement state and the 
NRC over a period of time. 122 
The NRC criteria conclude with an admonition that "[s]tate 
practices for assuring the fair and impartial administration of reg-
ulatory law, including provision for public participation where ap-
propriate, should be incorporated in procedures" for rulemaking, 
license evaluation, and enforcement actions.123 Both the Uranium 
Mill Tailings Act and the specific criteria addressing uranium mill 
licensing require additional state procedures in these areas. As a 
guidance document, the general criteria do not provide much spe-
levels and concentrations of radiation, precautionary procedures, waste disposal require-
ments, records and notification requirements and enforcement. 
118 46 Fed. Reg. 7450, 7451 (1981) (criterion 11). Criterion 19 does not specifically require 
the agreement state to implement any particular enforcement method. It states that the 
enforcement system "may include, as appropriate, administrative remedies looking toward 
issuance of orders requiring affirmative action or suspension or revocation of the right to 
possess and use materials, and the impounding of the materials, the obtaining of injunctive 
relief, and the imposing of civil or criminal penalties." !d. at 7542. · 
111 /d. at 7541, 7542 (criteria 5, 16). 
••• Criterion 16 states that "frequency of inspection shall be directly related to the 
amount and kind of material and type of operation licensed, and it shall be adequate to 
ensure compliance." Id. at 7542. This vague standard apparently requires more frequent 
inspections of larger or complex facilities. 
m /d. The NRC has not clearly established the degree to which an agreement state may 
rely upon consultants for monitoring and inspection functions. 
111 The sufficiency of agreement state staffing levels may also become a matter of signifi-
cant conflict after the initial federal/state agreement has been negotiated. The NRC has 
criticized states for the level of program staffing during periodic state evaluations and in the 
amendment of existing agreements. · 
••• 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7543 (1981). 
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cific advice to a state considering affiliation with the Agreement 
State Program. 
2. Additional Criteria for State Regulation of Uranium Milling 
and Mill Tailings 
Pursuant to the Uranium Mill Tailings Act of 1978, the NRC 
established a number of procedural requirements for rulemaking 
and licensing that have special application to states intending to 
undertake uranium mill tailings licensing. Most likely, many of 
these procedural requirements are provided under existing state 
administrative law.124 If not, legislation must be enacted to ensure 
the public participationlrights required by the NRC.m 
In addition to procedural requirements for rulemaking and li-
censing, the NRC requires that an agreement state develop proce-
dures for preparing an environmental impact analysis of a state-
issued uranium mill license.126 The NRC regulations require that 
the environmental analysis include, at a minimum, an assessment 
of radiological and nonradiological public health impacts, impacts 
on surface water and groundwater, alternatives to the licensed ac-
tivities, and long term impacts of those actions.127 In practice, 
some agreement states have produced environmental analyses cov-
ering a broad range of potential impacts beyond those specified in 
the NRC regulations.128 
The agreement state must designate a lead agency to prepare the 
114 As of 1980, more than half the states had adopted an administrative procedure act 
based at least in part on the original or the revised model state administrative procedure 
act. See 14 Uniform Laws Annotated 357 (master ed. 1980). Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Mas-
sachusetts, New Mexico and Oregon have adopted comprehensive administrative procedure 
legislation not based upon the model act. 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1:10 
(2d ed. 1978). 
110 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7543 (1981) (criterion 29). 
118 Id. at 7544 (criterion 31). 
11
' Id. 
118 In Texas, for example, the Texas Bureau of Radiation Control issued an environmen-
tal assessment on a conventional uranium mill license application of the Anaconda Minerals 
Company in 1982. This assessment covered such subjects as climate, air quality, regional 
demography, socio-economics, land use, cultural resources, geology, hydrology, and the ecol-
ogy of the area. In addition, the proposed operation of the mill and the supporting mines 
were analyzed in terms of their non-radioactive and radioactive emissions, stabilization of 
tailings, operational monitoring, impact of accidents, impact of operations, alternatives, 
financial security, land ownership, and interagency review. See Texas Department of 
Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, Environmental Assessment, Safety Evaluation Report, 
and Proposed License Conditions Related to Anaconda Minerals Company Rhode Ranch 
Project, McMullen County, Texas (August 31, 1982) (Pub. No. TBRC EA-9) [hereinafter 
cited as Rhode Ranch Proiect Environmental Assessment]. 
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environmental analysis for a mill licensing proposal when a num-
ber of state and federal agencies have regulatory responsibilities 
regarding the proposed project.129 Since the production of an envi-
ronmental analysis would seem to require significant expertise, the 
agency may employ outside consulting services.130 
The background requirements for personnel regulating uranium 
mills are even more stringent than those for the members of the 
general regulatory agency. The staffing needed to process uranium 
mill applications fall into three separate categories: technical, ad-
ministrative, and support. 131 The NRC criteria define the functions 
of each of these three categories of employees.132 The NRC has es-
timated that between two and two and three-quarters total profes-
sional person-years of effort are required to process a new conven-
tional uranium mill license or a major renewal in order to satisfy 
the requirements of the Uranium Mill Tailings Act.133 This esti-
mate presumably reflects the manpower necessary to conduct the 
required environmental assessment and an in-plant safety review. 
A state should consider whether it can attract sufficiently knowl-
edgeable personnel before deciding to join the Agreement State 
Program. 
Other expenses are not easily measured. The NRC estimates 
that various miscellaneous post-licensing activities, including the 
issuance of minor license amendments, inspections, and environ-
mental surveillance, would require from one-half to one person-
year of effort per licensed facility. 134 This estimate does not appear 
to account for the possibility of a major environmental problem 
after the uranium mill facility is licensed. 
••• 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (criterion 33(b)). This requirement parallels a similar require-
ment of federal environmental impact statements. The Council on Environmental Quality 
regulations describe the designation of a lead agency supervising the preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact statement if multiple agencies are involved in a project subject to NEPA. 
40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 (1982). 
130 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 33(d)). The criterion emphasizes, however, 
that the consultants employed by the state be selected following a procedure that ensures, 
to the maximum extent possible, that they do not have a conflict of interest in the project 
they are evaluating. I d. The criterion states that the agreement agency cannot use the appli-
cant's environmental report in lieu of its own independent assessment of the proposed pro-
ject. ld. (criterion 33(b)). However, the criterion mysteriously states that "the lead agency 
may prepare an environmental assessment based upon an applicant's environmental re-
port." Id. (emphasis added). · 
131 /d. at 7545 (criterion 34). 
131 /d. (criterion 34(a)). 
133 Id . 
... Jd. 
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The NRC requires that an agreement state, in addition to licens-
ing personnel, have available "both field and laboratory instrumen-
tation sufficient to ensure the licensee's control of materials and to 
validate the licensee's measurements."1311 These instruments must 
be available in a state agency or through a commercial contrac-
tor.136 The use of outside contractors would be unavoidable in a 
state without a pre-existing laboratory facility and with a small 
number of mill licensees. 
In conclusion, it is difficult to estimate the total manpower nec-
essary to operate a uranium milling and tailings regulatory pro-
gram. Notably, the existing agreement states appear to have much 
larger staffs in their radiological control programs than the mini-
mum required by NRC guidelines. Furthermore, it would seem 
that much of the cost associated with such programs would be in-
curred during the initial stage of licensing a facility. Less staffing 
would be necessary to inspect and monitor a facility once it had 
been licensed. Therefore, without a continual flow of new facilities, 
a state bureaucracy created to perform environmental assessment 
and regulatory compliance analysis might find itself with little 
work to do. 
3. Authority Retained by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
The NRC has reserved significant authority over uranium mill-
ing and tailing regulation in agreement states. The agency requires 
that state regulatory programs be "equivalent to the extent practi-
cal or more stringent than regulations and standards adopted and 
enforced by the Commission, as required by Section 274 (o)."137 
Therefore, the NRC regulations, as augmented by the EPA general 
standards, serve as a floor for an agreement state's regulatory 
program. 
The NRC reserves the power to establish minimum standards 
governing reclamation, long-term surveillance and maintenance, 
and ownership of byproduct material.138 In addition, the NRC 
reserves the right to determine prior to the termination of a ura-
••• /d. at 7546 (criterion 36). 
188 /d. (criterion 36(b)). 
187 /d. at 7544 (criterion 32). The NRC regulations concerning the Agreement State Pro-
gram explicitly state that the agreement state's licensing standards must be equivalent to or 
more stringent than the NRC standards. 10 C.F.R. pt. 40, Appendix A (1983). 
188 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 30(a)); see also 10 C.F.R. § 150.15(a), (b) 
(1983). 
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nium mill license that the licensee has complied with decontamina-
tion, decommissioning and reclamation standards and ownership 
requirements applicable to the site.139 Since title to the mill tail-
ings and the tailings disposal site will be transferred either to the 
federal government or to the state at its option, 140 the governmen-
tal entity having custody would assume responsibility to protect 
the public from risks created by a site which has not been properly 
decontaminated. The NRC also reserves the authority to require 
monitoring, maintenance and emergency measures after the license 
is terminated.141 Finally, the NRC reserves the right to authorize 
the use of the surface or subsurface area of a uranium mill or mill 
tailings disposal site for other purposes after the closure of the 
facility. 142 
I 
4. Federal Evaluation of Agreement State Radiation Control 
Programs 
The NRC has issued guidelines concerning its periodic evalua-
tion of established agreement state programs.143 The guidelines ad-
dress six major elements of the state radiation and control pro-
gram: legislation and regulations, organization, management and 
administration, personnel, licensing, and compliance.144 These 
guidelines are used by the NRC during on-site reviews of agree-
ment state programs conducted approximately every eighteen 
months. During a review, the NRC determines whe.ther the pro-
gram is adequate to protect the public health and safety and 
whether the program is compatible with the NRC regulatory au-
thority.14a If there is a serious deficiency relating directly to public 
health or welfare, the NRC requests an immediate response and a 
follow-up review is conducted within six months.148 If the state 
program has not improved or if additional deficiencies are de-
tected, the NRC may initiate proceedings to revoke or suspend 
part or all of the state's agreement program.147 
100 Id. at 7544 (criterion 30(b)). 
140 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
, .. 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (1981) (criterion 30(d)). 
141 42 U.S.C. § 2113(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1982) . 
... 46 Fed. Reg. 59,341 (1981). 
••• Id. 
"" Id. at 59,342. 
••• Id. at 59,343. 
,., Id. 
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C. State Regulation of the Uranium Mining and Milling 
Industry 
1. Virginia's Approach to the Uranium Industry 
It is common for state legislatures to directly establish policy in 
an area of significant state interest by enacting statutes which cre-
ate prospective regulatory programs and administrative responsi-
bilities. Typically, the legislative branch sets forth general princi-
ples of governance and permits the state executive agency to 
implement its authority by administrative rulemaking, licensing 
and enforcement. 
However, the development of the uranium policy in Virginia has 
deviated from this model. The General Assembly has authorized 
the creation of a series of commissions to collect information on 
the nuclear fuels industry and assess the risks associated with es-
tablishing a uranium mine-mill complex in Pittsylvania County. In 
1982 the state's mining laws were specifically amended to regulate 
uranium exploration. This statute empowered the Virginia Divi-
sion of Mines to grant uranium exploration permits and estab-
lished specific performance standards applicable to uranium pros-
pecting. The legislature was careful, however, to prohibit uranium 
mining until it had established a more elaborate policy. The effect 
was to freeze the status quo without recognizing any vested rights 
to mine uranium. 
In 1983, the legislature created the Uranium Administrative 
Group (UAG) to coordinate and evaluate studies of the effects of 
uranium mining and to file a report with the Virginia Coal and 
Energy Commission by December 1, 1983. The report was to in-
form the Commission of the results of the studies, and make rec-
ommendations for legislation, if appropriate. By 1984, the UAG 
was still not prepared to render a definitive judgment on the future 
of uranium production in Virginia. 
In 1984, the quest for data about the health, safety and eco-
nomic effects of uranium mining spawned the creation of yet an-
other organization, the Uranium Task Force (UTF). The Task 
Force, representing various state agencies and other public interest 
representatives, was directed to formally assess the risks posed by 
the mining and milling project proposed for the Pittsylvania 
County site. The UTF made its final report in October, 1984.148 
"" The information in the remainder of this subsection comes from Uranium Task Force, 
Uranium Study Newsletter, Pub. No. 19 (October 1984). 
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The information it developed does not address all the questions 
that should be addressed prior to final licensing of the Pittsylvania 
County facility. However, it does respond to the mandate for de-
veloping an improved technical and administrative base in order to 
make an informed legislative decision. The Task Force concluded 
that uranium development activity can be undertaken with an ac-
ceptable level of risk and with economic benefits to the state if and 
only if the following recommendations are adopted: 
1. Virginia should become an agreement state with the right to 
license a uranium production facility. 
2. Statewide standards for acceptable levels of radiation expo-
sure should be made more stringent than current federal standards 
by regulating all sources and pathways in a single two-part stan-
dard of twenty-five millirem per year (mrem/yr) for sources other 
than radon and one picocurie per liter (pCi/1) for radon. Together, 
these yield a maximum dose of two hundred eighty-five millirem 
per year. The proposed state standard accepts a statistical increase 
of 28.5 cases of fatal cancer per million from uranium production, 
as compared to fifty per million under the federal standard. 
3. A uranium mining, milling, and reclamation statute should be 
adopted. 
4. A non-degradation standard should apply to groundwater 
protection. 
5. No surface discharge of process water from either the mill or 
the tailings facility should be permitted. 
6. Those state regulations and performance standards which gov-
ern hazardous waste landfills should be specifically applied by stat-
ute to uranium development facilities. 
7. A schedule of financial guarantees and fines should be devel-
oped to assure strict compliance with license and permit condi-
tions, and a strict liability policy for damage should be adopted by 
the state for uranium facilities. 
·8. The State should adopt an administrative strategy that as-
signs the Health Department lead responsibility for negotiating an 
agreement with the NRC, and the Department of Mines, Minerals, 
and Energy lead reponsibility for on-site monitoring .. 
9. The UTF should prepare an estimate of the budgetary re-
quirements necessary to regulate uranium development in Virginia. 
The legislature may or may not adopt these recommendations. 
The discussion that follows, examining the regulation of mining 
and milling industries in other states, is intended as a point of 
comparison. 
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2. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Texas 
Texas has recently emerged as a significant producer of uranium 
ore. In 1982, it ranked third behind New Mexico and Wyoming 
with seventeen percent of domestic production.149 As of January 1, 
1983, eleven uranium oxide production facilities were operating in 
the state: the Chevron Resources Panna Maria uranium processing 
plant in Hobson, Texas, and ten in situ mining facilities. 1110 As an 
NRC agreement state, Texas has undertaken a comprehensive pro-
gram of uranium mining and milling regulation in which it exerts 
maximum regulatory control over the uranium recovery industry. 
Texas has long been active in the regulation of radioactive 
materials. The Texas Radiation Control Act was enacted in 1961. 
Texas became an agreement state with the Atomic Energy Com-
mission on March 1, 1963.1111 Under this arrangement, Texas was 
permitted to control a wide range of uranium-related activities, in-
cluding one uranium production facility previously licensed by the 
AEC. Texas has committed itself to establishing well-staffed state 
agencies to oversee the uranium industry. The major regulatory re-
sponsibilities for uranium mining and milling are accorded to the 
Texas Railroad Commission, Division of Surface Mining and Rec-
lamation, and the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radia-
tion Control. 
a. Uranium Exploration and Mine Regulation 
The Texas legislature amended preexisting surface mining and 
reclamation provisions in 1979 to specifically regulate uranium 
mining.1112 These provisions empower the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion to control uranium exploration, 1113 issue surface mining per-
mits/114 approve reclamation plans/1111 establish reclamation stan-
dards, 1116 create a system of performance bonding, 1117 and enforce its 
own permit conditions and regulations. 1118 The Texas statute bor-
rowed heavily from the state's coal surface mining laws. It conta~ns 
••• 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 9 (Table 1-8). 
••• Id. at 42 (Table VII-2). 
••• Governors' Report, supra note 78, at B-1. 
101 Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, §§ 131.001-.270 (Vernon 1978 & 1984 Supp.). 
••• ld. § 131.034 (Vernon 1978). 
, .. Id. § 131.131. 
ua Id. § 131.101. 
... ld. § 131.102. 
107 ld. §§ 131.201-.214. 
, .. Id. §§ 131.261-.270. 
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a specific procedure for the designation of certain lands as "unsuit-
able" for uranium mining, triggered by an application to undertake 
uranium surface mining.1119 A recent amendment to this statute en-
ables citizens to petition the Railroad Commission to have an area 
set aside as "unsuitable. "160 
The principal means of regulating uranium mining in Texas is 
the mining permit. The permitting process contains three desirable 
features. First, the Railroad Commission is directed to establish a 
procedure for considering combined permit applications for anum-
ber of uranium mines at noncontiguous sites.161 Second, a uranium 
mining permit application must be circulated to state agencies 
having an interest in the matter.162 Third, a uranium surface min-
ing permittee must obtain liability insurance which provides "bod-
ily injury protection and accidental business property damage" 
protection, at a level set by the Railroad Commission. 168 
The Texas statute also emphasizes site reclamation. The law re-
quires that a reclamation plan accompany each permit applica-
tion.164 This provision is designed to insure that the mined land is 
"restored to the same condition as the land that existed enjoyed 
before the mining or some substantially beneficial condition."1611 
This is similar to the provision of Virginia law requiring a reclama-
tion plan of non-coal mine operators;166 however, the Texas law 
deviates from its Virginia counterpart in setting forth a twenty-
part list of reclamation standards applicable to each permittec.167 
The Texas system of uranium mine licensing is reinforced by a 
two-pronged mechanism ensuring compliance with reclamation 
standards and permit conditions: performance bonding and en-
100 ld. §§ 131.035-.041. 
100 ld. § 131.039(a). 
111 ld. § 131.137. 
111 I d. § 131.139. The Texas statute expressly conditions the granting of a uranium permit 
on a finding by the Railroad Commission that the permit would be in compliance with state 
and federal law. See id. § 131.140. A permit will be denied if the Texas Water Quality Board 
or the Texas Air Control Board inform the Railroad Commission that the proposed mining 
operation would cause pollution of water or air in violation of state law. ld. § 131.141(3). 
The Railroad Commission may also deny the permit under the general rubric that the per-
mit will "endanger the health and safety of the public." I d. § 131.141(5). Consequently, the 
comments and opinions of other state agencies may be extremely important in the permit 
application process. 
181 Id. § 131.143. 
1 
.. Id. § 131.101(b)(1)-(7). 
110 ld. § 131.102(c). 
111 Va. Code § 45.1-182.1 (1980 & Supp. 1984). 
••• Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 131.102(b)(1)-(20) (Supp. 1984). 
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forcement actions. After the Railroad Commission approves an ap-
plicant's uranium mining permit and reclamation plan it must set 
a performance bond at a level sufficient to complete the reclama-
tion project.188 Although some operators may be accepted as self-
insurers, most must post a surety to secure payment of this per-
formance bond.189 The Texas statute wisely provides for adjust-
ment of the bond "to reflect changes in the cost of future reclama-
tion of lands mined or to be mined.m70 At the conclusion of 
satisfactory mine site reclamation, the performance bond may be 
released following a Commission inspection and evaluation of the 
restoration.171 A public hearing must be conducted if the Commis-
sion determines that the bond release is "significant."172 
To ensure compliance with permit conditions and statutory op-
erational requirements, the Texas legislation authorized a wide 
range of enforcement measures, including administrative orders 
••• Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 131.202 (Vernon 1978). The Texas statute provides 
for establishing the amount of the bond at a level "sufficient to ensure the completion of the 
reclamation plan if the work had to be performed by third party in event of forfeiture .... " 
I d. § 131.202(c). The Commission is instructed to set the amount of the bond following the 
advice of two independent estimates. Id. § 131.202(b). This procedure allows the applicant 
to submit its own estimate of reclamation costs. 
181 /d. § 131.203. The Texas statute permits self-bonding by a mine operator when the 
operator demonstrates the existence of a suitable agent to receive service of process and a 
history of financial solvency and continuous operation. I d. There is no express provision for 
changing a self-insurance bond to a secured bond in the event that the financial condition of 
the operator changes in the future. 
170 Id. § 131.206. This provision allows for a continuous modification of the bond's 
amount to reflect the changing costs of reclamation. The modification of the bond amount is 
made expressly subject to the procedure established by the statute for the release of the 
performance bond. Id. § 131.206(d). 
171 Id. § 131.210. The Commission is directed to inspect and evaluate the reclamation 
work of the operator to determine whether or not the release of the bond is appropriate. 
The statute directs the Commission to consider the degree of difficulty in completing the 
remaining reclamation, whether pollution of surface and subsurface water is occurring, the 
probability of continuance or future occurrence of pollution, and the estimated cost of abat-
ing pollution. Id. § 131.210(d)(1)-(4). 
The Texas statute allows "any person or the officer or head of a federal, state, or local 
government or agency" to file written objections to the proposed release of a bond placed by 
a mining operator. I d. § 131.214(a). The mining operator must publish a notice of the pro-
posed bond release for four consecutive weeks in a newspaper in the locality of the surface 
mining and reclamation operation. Id. § 131.209. The statute also provides for the direct 
notification by certified mail of the local governmental authority having jurisdiction over the 
mine. Id. § 131.213. 
171 Id. § 131.214(c). The Railroad Commission is accorded the sole responsibility for de-
termining which applications for bond release are significant enough to justify a public hear-
ing. Once a determination of significance has been made, the Railroad Commission must 
hold a public hearing within the locality in which the uranium mining activity was 
conducted. 
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and notices of violation, 173 civil suits for injunctive relief and civil 
penalties/74 and criminal prosecutions. 1711 Texas law does not ex-
pressly provide for citizens' suits. Therefore, enforcing compliance 
with permit conditions and statutory requirements rests in the 
hands of those state agencies given regulatory responsibility under 
the Texas Surface Mining Act, primarily the Railroad Commission 
and the Texas Attorney General. 
b. Regulation of Uranium Milling in Texas 
As is true in many states, mining and milling regulation in Texas 
are not consolidated in one state agency. Primary jurisdiction over 
uranium milling operations has been accorded, under an extensive 
radiation control statute/76 to the Department of Health, Bureau 
of Radiation Control. The Bureau has undertaken an impressive 
regulatory program and issued a number of regulations governing 
subjects under its jurisdiction. In October 1981 the agency issued 
regulations governing the licensing of uranium recovery 
facilities. 177 
An applicant for a Texas uranium milling license must submit a 
formal application and an environmental report to the Division of 
Licensing, Registration and Standards of the Bureau of Radiation 
Control. The applicant's environmental report must contain the 
following: (1) a description of the proposed project, (2) a discussion 
of the site characteristics including ecology, geology, topography, 
hydrology, meteorology, historical and cultural landmarks, and ar-
chaeology, (3) a description of the radiological and non-radiological 
impacts of the proposed action including waterway and ground 
178 /d. §§ 131.261-.263. The Railroad Commission is given a range of administrative pow-
ers to order the elimination of dangerous conditions or practices likely to cause harm to the 
public. /d. § 131.261. The agency is also accorded the power to issue notices of violations to 
the mine operator for less serious problems. /d. § 131.262. 
174 /d. §§ 31.265-.266, 31.270. The statute grants the Railroad Commission specific author-
ity to initiate civil suits for injunctive relief and to impose civil penalties of up to $5000 for 
each day of violation. 
••• Id. §§ 131.267-.269. The Texas law establishes criminal penalties for the willful and 
knowing violation of a permit condition or for failure to comply with an order issued by the 
Railroad Commission. Additional punishment for this behavior is a fine of up to $10,000 or 
imprisonment for up to one year or both. 
170 Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1984). 
177 Texas Dept. of Health, Division of Occupational Health and Radiation Control, Texas 
Regulations for Control of Radiation, Part 43 (October 1981). These regulations and the 
procedure adopted by Texas for the consideration of uranium mill licenses largely parallel 
the rules of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
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water impacts and long term effects, (4) a description of environ-
mental effects of accidents, (5) a discussion of tailings disposal and 
decommissioning, and (6) mention of site and project alterna-
tives.178 When the application and environmental report are com-
plete, copies are sent to a number of Texas state agencies for re-
view and comment. 
After receiving the environmental report, the Division of Envi-
ronmental Programs of the Bureau of Radiation Control prepares 
an environmental assessment of the uranium milling facility, as re-
quired under state and federal law.179 While the draft assessment 
is being prepared, another branch of the Division of Radiation 
Control, the Financial Analysis Program, conducts a financial in-
vestigation of the applicant and reviews the financial surety pro-
posed for the mill site. 
The license applicant must submit a closure plan, including an 
estimate of closure costs, in conjunction with its environmental re-
port.180 Should the uranium mill license be granted, the applicant 
must then post the surety. As with the bonding of uranium mining 
activities, the mill surety amount may be adjusted to take account 
of changes in the cost of completing site reclamation.181 Arrange-
ments must be made for the ultimate transfer of the milling site 
and tailings material to either the U.S. Government or the state of 
Texas.182 If it is anticipated a uranium milling site will be trans-
ferred to state ownership, the licensee must pay a charge of at least 
$250,000 into the Radiation and Perpetual Care fund to cover the 
cost of long term care and maintenance of the site.183 The agency's 
regulations specify that "the final disposition of tailings or waste 
should be such that the need for on-going active maintenance, to 
1
" Id. § 43.26(a)(1)-(6). 
170 The Texas Radiation Control Act contains a specific procedure for licensing of ura-
nium recovery facilities which requires that the Radiation Control Agency prepare a written 
analysis of any licensing proposal that will "have a significant impact on the human environ-
ment." Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f, § llA(a) (Vernon 1984 Supp.). The federal provision is 
found at 46 Fed. Reg. 7540, 7544 (criterion 31). 
180 Texas Regulations for Control of Radiation, supra note 177, § 43.60(c). 
181 I d. § 43.60(e). The regulations provide that the security "shall be adjusted to recognize 
any increases or decreases resulting from inflation, changes in engineering plans, activities 
performed, and any other conditions affecting costs." ld. 
181 Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 4590f, § 6A(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984). These land transfer require-
ments are imposed upon the state of Texas by the terms of the federal Uranium Mill Tail-
ings Act. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
188 The Texas Radiation Control statute makes a special provision for the Radiation and 
Perpetual Care Fund. ld § 16. 
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the maximum extent practicable, [is] eliminated."184 
While the environmental assessment and financial analysis are 
being performed, the Division of Compliance and Inspection con-
ducts a review of the applicant's proposed facility, equipment, and 
operating and emergency procedures. The Division of Radiation 
Control has established an extensive set of technical requirements 
applicable to the operational features of the proposed uranium 
mill. 186 The Division of Compliance and Inspection then makes its 
recommendations to the Divison of Licensing, Registration, and 
Standards concerning potential problems involving the proposed 
uranium mill project, which are incorporated into a safety analysis. 
This analysis is combined with the environmental assessment, and 
a final document is produced by the Bureau of Radiation Control. 
3. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Wyoming 
Seven uranium mills were operating in the state of Wyoming as 
of January 1, 1983.186 In 1982, the state ranked second to New 
Mexico with twenty percent of domestic uranium oxide produc-
tion.187 Wyoming regulates the mining and milling of uranium 
. through four state agencies: the Industrial Siting Commission 
under the Industrial Development and Siting Act, 188 the Depart-
ment of Environmental Quality under the Environmental Quality 
Act, 189 the State Mine Inspector and Mining Bureau, 190 and the 
State Engineer.191 The Department of Environmental Quality has 
been established as the state agency with comprehensive regula-
tory responsibilities.192 
18
• Texas Regulations for Control of Radiation, supra note 177, § 43.70(b). 
180 /d. § 43.40(a)-(m). These regulations provide a great deal of guidance for the uranium 
mill applicant in the design of the operational features of the facility. 
188 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 42 (Table VII-2). 
187 Id. at 9 (Table I-8). 
188 Wyoming Industrial Development and Siting Act, Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-12-101 to -121 
(1977 & Supp. 1984). 
188 Environmental Quality Act of 1973, Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-11-101 to -1104 (1977). 
180 Wyo. Stat. §§ 30-2-101 to -607 (1977). 
101 Id. §§ 9-1-901 to -908, 41-3-114, and 41-3-301 to -328. 
101 The Department is divided into three divisions -air, water and land - which have 
independent jurisdiction over the protection of these resources. /d. § 35-11-105. There is no 
consolidated permitting among the divisions. Telephone Interview with Gary Beach, De-
partment of Environmental Quality, Land Quality Division (July 20, 1983) [hereinafter cited 
as Beach Interview]. DEQ also has an independent Environmental Quality Council which is 
. the rulemaking body and hearings board for the DEQ. /d. § 35-11-112. The Council's pro-
ceedings must comply with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. /d. § 35-11-
112(a)(ii) and (0. 
118 Virginia Journal of Natural Resources Law [Vol. 4:81 
a. Exploration Licensing 
The Land Quality Division of the Wyoming Department of En-
vironmental Quality has an extensive mineral exploration licensing 
program, applicable to uranium exploration. A mining firm wishing 
to explore for uranium with earth-moving equipment must obtain 
an annual exploration permit from the agency. The mining com-
pany must submit an application thoroughly describing the pro-
posed exploration activity193 and must reclaim and restore the land 
"as early as practicable so as to prevent unnecessary erosion, sedi-
mentation, and pollution."194 The mining company must post a 
bond covering the "costs which would be incurred by the State in 
the event it is necessary for the State to forfeit such bond and ac-
complish reclamation of the affected area. "1911 The amount of the 
bond is set by the Land Quality Division and the bond is released 
or forfeited under the same procedures as for other surface mining 
bonds.196 
The Land Quality Division, acting pursuant to statutory author-
ity,197 has also established "completion and restoration" perform-
ance standards and bonding requirements for exploration con-
ducted by drilling.198 The mining company must post a $10,000 
bond for exploration in any one area, to be released only after com-
pliance with drill hole capping and restoration regulations has been 
certified by the Administrator of the Land Quality Division.199 
. 
b. Mining Regulation 
To commence mining, an operator must obtain permits from all 
three divisions of the Department of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ),200 since each of the divisions operates independently in is-
"
8 State of Wyoming, Department of Environmental Quality, Land Quality Division, 
Rules and Regulations, Chapter X, § l(c)(l)-(12) (1983) [hereinafter cited as Wyoming 
Land Quality Regulations]. 
104 I d. § 3(a). The Land Authority Division has issued regulations specifying standards for 
the rehabilitation of the areas which incorporate many of the same regulatory requirements 
applicable to mining activities. See id. §§ 2(a), (c) (referring to Chapter IV, §§ 2(b), 3(a), 
2(d), 3(d)). 
"" ld. § 4(a). 
188 Id. § 5; see also Wyo. Stat. §§ 35-11-421 to -423 (1977); Wyoming Land Quality Regu-
lations, supra note 193, at Chapter XVI. 
"' Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-404 (1977). 
188 Wyoming Land Quality Regulations, supra note 193, at Chapter XV. 
"" I d. § 4. If the drill hole plugging requirements are not met, the responsible party may 
be fined up to $5,000 or jailed for up to 90 days, or both. Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-404(j) (1977). 
100 See supra note 192. 
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suing permits. 201 The Land Quality Division of the Wyoming DEQ 
is the sub-agency with primary state regulatory authority over 
mining. The Wyoming statute creates an unusual double permit-
ting system for mining, licensing both the land and the mine oper-
ator. The first regulatory requirement is a permit to mine directed 
at the tract of land under consideration for mining.202 The Wyo-
ming statute enumerates specific items to be addressed in the per-
mit application;203 the most significant of these requirements is the 
submission of a reclamation plan204 that must be approved by the 
DEQ. If written objections are filed to the permit application in a 
timely manner, the DEQ must treat the case as a contested matter 
under Wyoming administrative law and hold an adjudicative hear-
ing.206 The Wyoming statute provides twelve grounds for denying a 
permit206 and clear time limits for the administrative process.207 
The second necessary permit is a license to mine, issued to the 
party who will mine on the land for which a mining permit has 
been granted. 208 At this point, the DEQ determines the size of the 
reclamation bond required for the mining project. 209 
The applicant must also obtain permits from the Wyoming State 
Engineer. The State Engineer must review the operational plans of 
the mine for approval of the water diversion necessary for the pro-
ject, the impoundmen~ of any waters in connection with opera-
tions, including wastewater ponds, and impoundment design.210 In 
situ mining has separate permitting requirements. 211 
c. Milling Regulation 
The State Engineer is empowered to regulate many of'the same 
••• Beach Interview, supra note 192. 
••• Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-405 (1977). 
••• Id. § 35-11-406. 
104 Id. § 35-11-406(b). The statute lists seventeen specific elements of the reclamation 
plan. ld. § 35-11-406(b)(i)-(xvii) . 
••• ld. § 35-11-406(g). 
102 Id. § 35-11-406(h). 
••• ld. § 35-11-406(e), (f), (g), (h), (j). The DEQ, Land Quality Division, is given 90 days 
for a completeness review of the application. Upon determination of completeness, the DEQ 
has 30 days for technical review if no hearing is requested or 60 days if one is. The ultimate 
decision on the permit must be issued within 15 days thereafter. 
102 Id. § 35-11-410. 
102 I d. § 35-11-410(c). The bond must be no less than $10,000 and set at a level to permit 
reclamation of the land disturbed during the first year of operation. ld. § 35-11-417(c). 
110 Id. § 41-3-114 (diversion of streams), § 41-3-301 (reservoir permits), § 41-3-308 (ap-
proval of impoundment designs). 
Ill I d. § 35-11-426, -427. 
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features of uranium mill tailings disposal as does the NRC. Al-
though Wyoming is technically a non-agreement state, the state 
agencies participate extensively with the NRC in controlling the 
uranium recovery industry. The State Engineer has a continuing 
duty to inspect impoundment structures,212 and the DEQ must 
also monitor compliance with its operational regulations. 213 
The uranium mill must obtain Wyoming operating permits. As 
with mining, the milling operator must obtain air, land, and water 
permits from DEQ and the State Engineer.214 DEQ's Land Quality 
Division regulations reflect the state's belief that it retains the au-
thority to regulate uranium mill tailings.2111 The precise extent of 
this independent state power has never been tested in litigation. 
However, the NRC has apparently agreed that the Wyoming Land 
Quality Division will be consulted concerning reclamation plans for 
the uranium mill and tailings ponds. 216 
The unusual relationship between Wyoming and the NRC has 
allowed the state to participate in the regulation of the uranium 
production industry without becoming a fully accredited agree-
ment state. On the other hand, Wyoming's aggressive posture has 
required the funding of state agencies at a level high enough to 
permit active supervision of mining and milling operations. 
4. Regulation of Uranium Mining and Milling in Utah 
Utah is a relatively minor producer of uranium oxide. At present 
there are only three conventional uranium mills and one heap 
leaching operation in the state. 217 Utah is not an agreement state 
and does not regulate uranium milling. Therefore, the Utah regula-
tory program focuses on uranium mining. The Utah statutory and 
administrative structure is an example of limited state regulation 
of the uranium mining and milling industry. 
The regulation of all mining activities in Utah is governed by the 
111 /d. § 41-3-308. The DEQ also reviews impoundment designs in its permitting process. 
118 /d. § 35-11-109. 
"" State regulations apply to uranium milling, because the Engineer's duties extend to 
any project requiring water and impoundments and because DEQ regards milling as an as-
pect of mining. 
110 Beach Interview, supra note 192. 
110 Telephone interview with Glen Mooney, DEQ, Land Quality Division (July 13, 1983). 
117 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 42 (Table VII-2). The 
three conventional uranium mills have a relatively small combined operating capacity ·of 
4150 tons of ore per day. /d. 
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Utah Mined Land Reclamation Act.218 The Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining and the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining have primary ju-
risdiction over mining activity within the state. The Board estab-
lishes rules and regulations for the Division to enforce. The Board 
also has the authority to conduct hearings and issue enforcement 
orders, 219 while the Division has authority to issue permits. 220 The 
Utah statute does not distinguish between exploration and opera-
tion of the mine; its definition of "mining operations" encompasses 
"the exploration for, development of, or the extraction of a mineral 
deposit from its natural occurrences."221 Under the Reclamation 
Act, state approval is necessary for a broad range of mine related 
activities including exploration, mining, and such additional ac-
tions as "on-site transportation, concentrating, milling, evapora-
tion, and other primary processing."222 This definition of state ju-
risdiction could conflict with the NRC's reclamation standards for 
uranium mills. 223 
Before beginning a mining operation, a mine operator must file a 
notice of intention with the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. The 
Reclamation Act requires that the applicant submit a reclamation 
plan with the notice.224 This statute does not, however, specify the 
components of the reclamation plan or the standard of perform-
ance to be met by the reclamation activities.2211 
118 Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-8-1 to -23 (1981 & Supp. 1983) . 
... ld. § 40-8-6 (1981). 
110 The Utah statutes do not explicitly provide for the granting of a permit or a license 
but rather require that an applicant for mining operations file a notice of intention with the 
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining. /d. § 40-8-13(1). If the statutory and administrative requi-
sites are met the Division may allow the mining activity to proceed. /d. § 40-8-13(4). 
Ill ld. § 40-8-4(6) . 
... ld. 
113 Utah law does direct the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining to coordinate its rules, regu-
lations and procedures with those of other agencies. The objective of this requirement is to 
"minimize the need for operators and prospective operators to undertake duplicatory, over-
lapping, or conflicting compliance procedures." /d. § 40-8-5(2) . 
••• ld. § 40-8-13(1). 
110 Utah statute establishes three objectives for the Mined Land Reclamation program: 
(a) to return the land, concurrently with mining or within a reasonable amount of 
time thereafter, to a stable, ecological condition compatible with past, present, and 
probable future local land uses; 
(b) to minimize or prevent present and future on-site or off-site environmental deg-
radation caused by mining operations to the ecologic and hydrologic regimes and to 
meet other pertinent state and federal regulations regarding air and water quality 
standards and health and safety criteria; 
(c) to minimize or prevent future hazards to public safety and welfare. 
ld. at§ 4-8-12(a)-(c). These statutory objectives do not require that the land be restored to 
the productivity and quality that it had immediately preceding the mining activity. In fact 
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The Utah statute requires the mine operator to furnish evidence 
of insurance policies or other information indicating that it will be 
"financially responsible during the proposed mining operations for 
the payment of off-site public liability or property damage claims 
for which he may become liable."228 The insurance requirement 
stands in addition to the reclamation surety that is statutorily re-
quired for the mining operation. 227 
The application procedure established by statute requires that 
the Oil, Gas and Mining Division tentatively decide on the merits 
of the notice of intention. Assuming that the agency recommends 
approval, this tentative decision must be published in local news-
papers and newspapers of the capital city, and mailed to the local 
zoning authority.228 Any person or agency who wishes to challenge 
the decision must file a written protest with the Oil, Gas and Min-
ing Division within thirty days after the date of last publication. 229 
If the written objections are timely received, the Board must hold 
a hearing280 and enter its decision within sixty days.281 
After the operator's notice of intention to mine is approved, the 
operator must post a surety with the Division in an amount suffi-
cient to cover reclamation costs. 282 Once approved, the notice of 
intention becomes a permanent permit to mine unless it is with-
drawn for one of several enumerated reasons. 288 The Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining conducts inspections of the mine site and re-
quires an annual progress report from the mine operator. 
The Mined Land Reclamation Act specifically requires that the 
mining company comply with all other applicable statutes, rules 
and regulations. m The statute also directs the Division to cooper-
ate with all local, state and federal agencies. Consequently, before 
mining operations begin, a conference is held by the Division and 
other state agencies having regulatory authority over the mine, in-
its language presents a rather amorphous standard of restoration . 
••• /d. § 40-8-13(1). 
••• ld. § 40-8-14; see infra note 232 and accompanying text . 
... ld. § 430-8-13(4) . 
••• ld . 
... ld . 
••• ld. § 40-8-8(1). 
111 /d. § 40-8-14. The Oil, Gas and Mining Board establishes the amount of the surety for 
a mine operator whose notice of intention has been approved. The surety could be provided 
by a written contractual agreement, collateral, bond or other form of insured guarantee, 
deposited securities, or cash. /d. § 40-8-14(3). 
188 /d. § 40-8-16(2)(a)-(c) . 
... ld. § 40-8-17(1). 
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eluding the Solid and Hazardous Waste Committee, the Air Con-
servation Committee, and the Water Pollution Committee.2311 This 
conference is designed to determine what state permits, if any, the 
project will need and to expedite the permit process. 
5. Legislative Responses to Uranium Development in Non- West-
ern States 
While the Western states of New Mexico, Wyoming, Texas, 
Washington, Colorado, and Utah have dominated the uranium in-
dustry, exploration for new sources of uranium ore has recently oc-
curred in many Eastern states. Despite the recent recession in the 
nuclear fuels industry, companies are still exploring for new do-
mestic sources of uranium. In 1982, approximately twenty-five per-
cent of all exploratory drilling for uranium resources took place in 
Alaska, Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia and Washing-
ton. 236 Reacting to this developing interest, several Eastern states 
have recently adopted legislation restricting or prohibiting ura-
nium production within their borders. 
a. New Jersey 
In New Jersey, the legislature acted to ban uranium exploration, 
mining and milling within the state for a period of seven years, 
until 1988.237 This action followed the discovery of uranium in a 
geological area known as the Redding Prong238 and the adoption of 
several township ordinances prohibiting exploration, mining and 
milling of uranium.239 The legislation granted the New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection six years in which to pre-
pare a report for the Governor and the legislature analyzing the 
dangers associated with uranium mining and milling and including 
"recommendations for the prohibition or regulation of these activi-
ties upon the expiration of this act."2" 0 The law established strict 
enforcement sanctions for violations of the moratorium.2" 1 In addi-
... Telephone conversation with Thomas Tetting, Engineering Geologist, Utah Division of 
Oil, Gas and Mining (July 28, 1983). 
110 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 49 (Table VIII-1). 
137 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 13:1 J-1 (West Supp. 1984) . 
... N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1980, at 26, col. 3. 
••• I d. at 26, col. 5. 
••• N.J. Rev. Stat. § 13:1 J-5(a) (West Supp. 1984) . 
... !d. § 13-1 J-2(b). 
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tion, it preserved the right of local governments to regulate or pro-
hibit uranium development. 242 
b. New York 
In June 1983, New York enacted a statute which prohibits the 
uranium mining by any method within the state for a period of ten 
years.243 Unlike the New Jersey law, which comprehensively pro-
hibits the exploration, mining and milling of uranium, the New 
York legislation bans only mining. The statute does not specifically 
preclude uranium exploration but could be interpreted to prohibit 
such activities. 244 
Under the statute, the New York Department of Environmental 
Conservation must study the uranium mining issue and submit to 
the Governor and the legislature recommendations concerning the 
extension of the moratorium.240 The statute suggests, however, that 
the present legislation could be preempted by federal law.246 The 
legal implications of a permanent state-wide ban on uranium min-
ing and milling in New York have not yet been confronted in 
litigation . 
••• ld. § 13:1 J-4. 
••• N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Laws Ann. § 22-1010 to -1070 (McKinney 1984). The New York 
legislature grounded its moratorium upon findings that "mining of uranium may pose a 
significant danger to public health, safety and welfare" due to (1) the potential contamina-
tion and depletion of surface and groundwater, (2) possible impact of radioactive airborne 
particulates upon public health and agriculture, (3) non-existence of adequate waste storage 
methods for uranium mining, (4) high governmental costs associated with the clean-up of 
abandoned mine site, (5) lack of technical and administrative techniques to abate the 
ha2ards of uranium mining and (6) the damaging effect of uranium mining upon scenic 
qualities and tourism. /d. § 22-1030(1)-(6). 
... The statute defines mining as "the extraction or removal of minerals from the ground 
or the breaking of the surface soil in order to facilitate or accomplish the extraction or 
removal of such minerals for commercial or industrial use; but shall not include excavation 
or grading when conducted solely in aid of on-site farming or construction." ld. § 22-
1050(1). This definition is followed by the general prohibition that "no person shall mine for 
uranium by any method including, but not limited to, drilling, excavation, and liquid or 
chemical extraction." I d. § 22-1070. Although the statute does not seem to address itself to 
the commercial exploration of uranium sources, the definition of mining is broad enough to 
include active exploration methods . 
... L. 1983, c. 384, §4 (June 27, 1983). 
••• The notes following this section of the New York Code contain a severability clause 
which states that "this act shall be construed so as not to conflict with applicable federal or 
state laws, rules or regulations. In the event that a state or federal law, rule or regulation is 
held to preempt any clause or section of this act, or in the event that any such clause or 
section is held invalid, such clause or section shall be severable and shall not affect the 
validity of the remainder of this act." L. 1983, c. 384, §5 (June 27, 1983). 
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c. Vermont 
The Vermont legislature enacted a statute in April 1980 which is 
quite different from the temporary moratorium and agency study 
laws of New York and New Jersey. Rather than prohibiting ura-
nium mining and milling, Vermont adopted a unique procedure re-
quiring the state's General Assembly, by act of legislation, to legis-
late express prior approval authorizing the local district 
environmental commission to consider an application for a ura-
nium processing facility. 247 The effect of the 1980 amendment was 
to require formal legislative approval in addition to the pre-ex-
isting regional land use permit. The action of the Vermont legisla-
ture has apparently deterred potential uranium mining and milling 
firms; however, these special approval requirements may be subject 
to legal challenge. 248 
The statutes enacted in New Jersey, New York and Vermont 
clearly do not encourage firms wishing to produce source material. 
The legislatures of these states have been persuaded that uranium 
production, if not totally unacceptable, at least raises serious 
enough environmental and social concern that a long-term evalua-
tion of the industry must be conducted before uranium production 
is authorized. The caution with which these three states have ap-
proached the issue reflects the uncertain environmental effects of 
implementing in an Eastern state mining and processing technol-
ogy developed in the West. 
d. Minnesota 
During 1982, mmmg firms undertook exploratory drilling for 
uranium ore in Minnesota.249 The Minnesota legislature has not 
yet adopted statutes that specifically address the regulation of the 
uranium mining and milling industry. It has, however, enacted a 
conventional array of governmental controls that would apply to 
uranium mining and milling. 
••• Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 6083(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Under general Vermont land use 
and development law, activities coming within a statutory definition of "development" (in-
cluding uranium mining and milling) must receive a permit from the regional District Com-
mission. /d. § 6001(3). A uranium development project would have to satisfy an extensive 
list of conditions in order to receive a permit from the District Commission. /d. § 
6086(a)(1)-(10). The statute clearly notes that approval of the proposal by the General As-
sembly "shall not be construed as approval of any particular application or proposal for 
development." /d. 
••• See N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at 20, col. 3. 
140 1983 Statistical Data of the Uranium Industry, supra note 4, at 49 (Table VIII-1). 
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The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources has responsib-
lity for granting prospecting permits and mining permits on state 
lands. 2110 As part of this licensing process, a reclamation plan must 
be filed by the applicant for proposed mines and mills. 2111 A bond 
must be posted to ensure performance of the reclamation plan. 2112 
The Department of Health has authority over exploratory bor-
ing,2118 including the responsibility to inspect sites and license ex-
ploratory boring.2114 The Department of Natural Resources is re-
sponsible for permitting the use and diversion of surface and 
ground water and inspecting dams. m The Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency conducts the state's water, air, noise, and solid 
waste program. As in most states, uranium mines and mills would 
be subject to any applicable air and water pollution control 
regulations. 2116 
Of special importance to the uranium industry is the Minnesota 
Radioactive Waste Management Act, which prohibits construction 
of a "radioactive waste management facility" without express au-
thorization from the state legislature. 2117 The broad definition of 
"radioactive waste" would appear to encompass the disposal of 
uranium mill tailings2118 and would therefore make construction of 
a uranium mill dependent on permission from the Minnesota 
legislature. 
The Environmental Quality Board carries out the provisions of 
the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).2119 This Act re-
quires an environmental impact statement for a project having a 
significant environmental impact and a connection to state govern-
mental action. 260 A uranium recovery facility under state permit 
authority would be required to comply with MEP A. The Act also 
••• Minn. Stat. Ann. § 93.43 (West 1977 & 1982 Supp.). 
••• Id. § 93.481. 
••• I d. § 93.49 The process of submitting a reclamation plan and posting a bond is similar 
to the licensing system in Virginia. See Va. Code §§ 45.1-182.1, -183, -184 (1980). 
••• Minn. Stat. Ann. § 156A.01 (West Supp. 1982) (authorization to control, for health 
purposes, not only exploratory boring, but also water wells). 
••• ld. § 156A.071 . 
••• ld. §§ 105.37, 105.41, 104.415, 105.417, 105.42, 105.46, 105.47, 105.52 . 
••• ld. §§ 115, 116 . 
.., Id. § 116C.72. 
••• "Radioactive waste" means "(a) useless or unwanted capturable radioactive residues 
produced incidental to the use of radioactive material; or (b) useless or unwanted radioac-
tive material; or (c) otherwise nonradioactive material made radioactive by contamination 
with radioactive material." Id. § 116C.71(6). 
••• Id. § 1160.04. 
••• ld. § 116D.04(2a). 
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provides that feasible alternatives should be considered and that 
economic considerations alone should not dictate feasibility.261 
This statute also imposes upon state agencies procedural duties 
and substantive standards similar to those NEPA imposes on the 
federal government, enforceable under state law.262 
In 1981, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board prepared a 
report for the state legislature expressing a number of concerns 
about uranium mining and milling.263 .The report implicitly as-
sumed that new rules governing uranium mining and milling would 
need to be adopted, and that the state should take an active role in 
regulating the industry. Specifically, the report advised the state to 
adopt special reclamation plans for uranium mining facilities, and 
to control radon release from the mines.264 The report also advised 
that ambiguous points in the state's environmental regulations, 
such as whether the Solid Waste Management Act applies, be clar-
ified before the new industry is authorized.2611 The report also rec-
ommended that Minnesota become an agreement state in order to 
assume responsibility for hazards associated with uranium mill 
tailings. 266 
Minnesota's response to exploratory drilling illustrates a state 
with an elaborate system of environmental laws in place - all of 
which would apply to uranium mining - which yet wishes to ac-
tively control the development of the industry by tailoring laws 
specifically to uranium mining. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
From this discussion it is clear that different states have ap-
proached the uranium production industry in a variety of ways. 
Some have considered it an acceptable industry that nonetheless 
requires regulation by the federal and state governments, while 
others have banned it altogether. Virginia could become the first 
••• ld. § 1160.04(6). 
••• The obligations imposed by MEPA fall upon state agencies. The state legislature en-
acted the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act in 1971 to provide a mechanism by which 
citizens can enforce the duties established under the Environmental Policy Act and other 
state statutes. ld. § 1168.01-.13; see Peer v. Minn. Envir. Quality Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 
(Minn. 1978). 
••• Minnesota Environmental Quality Board, Uranium Exploration, Mining and Milling 
in Minnesota: A Review of the State's Regulatory Framework (May 1981) . 
... ld. at 6, 14-15, 22. 
••• Id. at 14, 15, 52-53 . 
... ld. at 32-35. 
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Eastern state to sanction uranium mining and milling within its 
borders. Should Virginia choose to accept uranium development, it 
will have great flexibility in setting the terms which control the 
operation of the new industry. In 1985, the Virginia General As-
sembly can choose from among at least five potential courses of 
action. The ways in which other states have chosen to regulate the 
industry reflect a range of positions on the safety of the industry 
and the regulatory capabilities of various government agencies. 
First, the General Assembly could permanently ban uranium 
mining. A permanent ban might be challenged in court by propo-
nents of uranium development on grounds of federal preemption 
or obstruction of interstate commerce. 
Second, the Assembly could conclude that it does not yet have 
sufficient information to make a decision on uranium development 
and extend the uranium mining moratorium until such informa-
tion is available. 
Third, the legislature could without enacting specific legislation 
simply lift the current prohibition. Uranium exploration and min-
ing would then be regulated by state agencies under the authority 
they currently possess. Uranium milling would be regulated by the 
NRC. This alternative requires the least initiative and involves the 
state government only in oversight of exploration and mining. 
Fourth, the Assembly could amend the state's mining laws to 
specifically accommodate uranium mining. This would acknowl-
edge that uranium mining creates hazards justifying specific statu-
tory attention. As with the third alternative, the regulation of ura-
nium milling operations would still rest with the NRC. 
Fifth, the Assembly could adopt legislation regulating uranium 
mining and committing the state to becoming an agreement state 
under the NRC program. This would be the most active and costly 
level of state involvement in the regulation of the uranium indus-
try, but it offers Virginia maximum possible control over the 
industry. 
Should the General Assembly adopt this fifth option it should 
consider three issues in its legislation: the allocation of regulatory 
responsibilities to state agencies, environmental impact review 
analysis, and financial liability provisions. The Assembly must de-
cide what kind of institutional organization should regulate the 
uranium industry. Should pre-existing or newly created state agen-
cies regulate this new industry? The legislature must consider cost 
and institutional capabilities. Next, the legislature must establish 
decisionmaking standards to govern the agencies' actions. Such 
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standards should constrain agency discretion in licensing uranium 
facilities. In addition, the legislature must implement administra-
tive procedures which define the method by which important li-
censing decisions will be made. The question of public participa-
tion must be adequately addressed. Since the issue of uranium 
facility licensing is controversial, it is important to insure that the 
public is provided with the opportunity to obtain relevant informa-
tion and to participate in both rulemaking and licensing proceed-
ings. It is especially important that the opinions of those residents 
living close to a proposed uranium facility be incorporated into the 
decisionmaking process. In addition, the legislature should author-
ize judicial review of rulemaking and licensing decisions. This 
would insure that determinations regarding uranium development 
activities are tested by an impartial judicial body. Funding the reg-
ulatory system is also a key issue. The legislation should secure 
financial support for the regulatory system through the imposition 
of severance taxes and/or permit and licensing fees. This policy 
would force the regulated industry to bear the expenses of its own 
governmental regulation and would assure that funds not be di-
verted from other state purposes. 
Environmental impact review of the uranium production indus-
try is another important issue. The Uranium Mill Tailings Act re-
quires that states regulating uranium mills conduct an environ-
mental review similar to that required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act. Should Virginia become an agreement 
state, the authorizing legislation would have to consider the neces-
sary administrative agency responsibilities and what actions would 
be subject to this environmental analysis. The analysis should be 
similar to an environmental impact statement prepared by the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission. The state agency should prepare an 
analysis not only of the proposal currently before the legislature 
but also of license renewals and any proposals for new mines or 
mills. The environmental analysis and review should consider in an 
integrated fashion both the mining and milling aspects of uranium 
development. The legislation must clearly define the administra-
tive responsibility for environmental impact review. Since a num-
ber of state agencies will possess regulatory control over any pro-
posal, it will be necessary to designate a lead agency which will be 
responsible for the preparation of the impact statement. The legis-
lation must also establish a process for environmental impact re-
view including timetables, comment periods, publication require-
ments, and public hearing rights. 
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The financial liability of uranium mining and milling facility op-
erators is a final significant issue. Any uranium development per-
mitted in Virginia would be required to conform to stringent de-
sign, operation and closure requirements. The authorizing 
legislation should provide for financial liability for those operators 
who fail to meet these requirements. The statute should require 
that an operator of a uranium mine or mill post a sufficient per-
formance bond to insure that all required operation and closure 
activities are performed. The legislation should also create liability 
for property damage, personal injury, and remedial action associ-
ated with the operation of the facility, tied to a liability standard 
based on negligence, modified strict liability, or true strict liability. 
The liability could be unlimited or confined by a statutory maxi-
mum. The statute should also allocate burdens of proof in any ac-
tion arising under the liability provisions. The inclusion of a liabil-
ity provision may be important in obtaining approval of the 
authorizing legislation and would serve as a backstop should inju-
ries occur in spite of the best governmental efforts at regulating 
the industry. 
The uranium mining issue presents Virginia with the task of es-
tablishing policy on a matter requiring a careful balancing of pub-
lic health and safety risks against potential economic benefits. 
Whatever the resolution of the issue, the success or failure of the 
ultimate policy choice will not be immediately known. Regulatory 
choices made today will be tested over the indefinite future. Due to 
the uncertainty inherent in this decision, Virginia's legislators find 
themselves confronting difficult policy decisions. 
In an area of uncertainty, with significant public health risks, it 
is critically important to secure accurate information to aid in se-
lecting the best policy alternative. It is also necessary in developing 
a controversial state policy to include a wide spectrum of views in 
the decisionmaking process. The meaningful participation of pub-
lic interest organizations, individuals, and local governments 
should be encouraged. Regulation of a new industry calls for an 
accurate estimation of the regulatory capabilities of relevant gov-
ernmental agencies; an honest appraisal of these capabilities is 
necessary to establish a framework of regulatory responsibility. 
These concerns should govern the Assembly in adopting its pol-
icy on the uranium production issue. Decisions made today will 
have important effects not only tomorrow but for many years 
thereafter. 
